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Foreword 
 
The present study is part of the general theme: ‘Looking Forward 
beyond Enlargement to the Future shape of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership’. The essential aim of this project is first of all, to 
analyse and compare the different proposals emanating from the 
European Convention, the European Commission and its President, 
the European Parliament and the Members States of the future 
enlarged European Union regarding the emerging EU’s 
Neighbourhood Policy. Second, to appraise the various perceptions 
of EU’s eastern and southern neighbours with regard to this new 
proposed policy and, thirdly, to try to evaluate the potential impact 
of this policy on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). 
 
Launching and stimulating the debate and fostering further research 
are the essential aims of the study. The analysis is notably based on 
the relevant EU official documents such as the draft constitutional 
Treaty, the recent Communications adopted by the European 
Commission and the European Parliament as well as the 
Conclusions of the 2002 Copenhagen European Council. Common 
strategies adopted within the framework of the CFSP are also taken 
into account alongside the existing network of bilateral agreements. 
 
The present study tries to answer the following questions: 
 
-  Is the launching of this new policy compatible with the 
EMP as it was conceived in Barcelona in 1995? 
-  What are the main obstacles to such a policy? 
-  What could be the optimum strategies for the EU’s 
partners? 
-  Is there a need for new institutions or new Instruments to 
implement this new policy?  
-  Is there a need for a new form of association with the 
neighbouring countries of the EU? 
-  What are the main differences between the perceptions of 
the (potential) candidate countries and of the non-candidate 
countries regarding the envisaged policy. 
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Introduction: on Proximity and Neighbourhood 
 
The notions of proximity, periphery, and neighbourhood are 
nothing new within the European integration process. Previous 
EEC and then EU enlargements have already raised such issues
3 
but the specificity of the next enlargement(s) is that it is now urgent 
to, on the one hand, progressively clarify the definitive limits of the 
enlarged Union and, on the other hand, to offer new perspectives 
for those neighbouring countries having no (immediate) 
perspective of accession. 
 
Already in 1992, the Council identified, on the basis of three 
specific factors (the geographical proximity of a given region or 
country; an important interest in the political and economic 
stability of a region or a country; the existence of threats to the 
security interests of the Union),
4 a limited number of geographical 
areas requiring special attention for the forthcoming CFSP joint 
actions. A distinction was made between two different areas: 
 
A)  ‘Central and Eastern Europe’, including: 
 
1.  Russia and the former Soviet Republics,  
2.  Other countries in Central and Eastern Europe including the 
Balkans 
3. Former  Yugoslavia 
 
B)  ‘Maghreb and Middle East’ 
 
1. Maghreb 
2. Middle  East 
 
                                                 
3 In 1992 a debate led to the conclusion that the limits of Europe ‘cannot be 
condensed into a simple formula, and is subject to review by each succeeding 
generation’. European Commission, Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement, 
Bull. EC, 1992, supplement 3, p.11. 
4 Report to the European Council in Lisbon on the likely development of the 
CFSP with a view to identifying areas open to joint action vis à vis particular 
countries or groups of countries, Bull. EC, 1992, 6, point I.31.  
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In other words, a hierarchy of ‘target neighbouring countries’ was 
already introduced in 1992 with regards to the -at that time 
emerging- CFSP. The forthcoming enlargement, together with the 
Stabilisation Process in the Balkan region, now gives new impetus 
to this discussion. It is striking that the Commission, already in 
1992, referred to the challenge of organising well-established 
relations with ‘the wider Europe’. Whereas this concept, at that 
time, primarily referred to the new democracies of Central and 
Eastern Europe, a decade of (geo-)political evolutions led to a new 
interpretation. 
 
Two years later, while preparing the forthcoming Barcelona 
Conference, the December 1994 Essen European Council explicitly 
recognised the necessity for the EU to establish ‘balanced relations 
with all its neighbours’. At the following European Council, held in 
Cannes in June 1995, the Member States went further: ‘an 
ambitious policy of cooperation to the south forms a counterpart to 
the policy of openness to the east and gives the European Union’s 
external action its geopolitical coherence’
5. These two statements 
were clearly adopted in order to reassure the Mediterranean 
partners of the EU, who were already aware of the consequences of 
the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
 
In Agenda 2000, adopted on 15 July 1997, the European 
Commission, for its part, explicitly acknowledged that enlargement 
‘will influence EU relations and policies towards third countries 
and regions’.
6 It warned that ‘adverse effects could result from 
enlargement, were it to be perceived as raising new barriers in 
Europe.’ To avoid such a scenario particular attention must be paid 
to ‘the legitimate security and economic concerns’ of those not 
included in the enlargement strategy. Unfortunately, these 
statements did not, at that time, result in a well thought-out and 
fully developed strategic policy.
7  
                                                 
5 Emphasis added. 
6 Agenda 2000. The Challenge of Enlargement (Vol. II), COM (97) 2000 final, 
15 July 1997, p.14. 
7 Only a number of unsubstantiated, apparently cursory, statements have been 
taken up and recapitulated in the Commission strategy reports on enlargement. 
For instance, it has become axiomatic to state that ‘enlargement will benefit not 
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The Amsterdam Treaty, which entered into force 1
st May 1999, 
provided for a new instrument to strengthen the Union’s 
relationship with its future neighbours. According to the new 
Article 13 EU, ‘the European Council can decide on Common 
Strategies (CSs) to be implemented by the Union in areas where the 
Member States have important interests in common.’ It soon 
became clear that, taking into account the forthcoming enlargement 
and the development of the acquis, the first CSs were to focus on 
the regions neighbouring the enlarged EU. Whereas subsequent 
European Council meetings effectively adopted CSs towards 
Russia,
8 Ukraine
9 and the Mediterranean region,
10 the development 
of a specific Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) for the 
countries of South-Eastern Europe gradually ruled out the idea of a 
particular Balkan CS. 
 
At another level, the European Conference initiative clearly 
illustrates the Union’s ad hoc reactions to the external challenges of 
enlargement. This instrument was initially created as a forum for 
political consultation on issues of common interest to the EU 
Member States and the European States aspiring to accede. In spite 
of the vagueness of this expression, the offer of participation in the 
European Conference was primarily directed at Turkey. Countries 
such as Moldova and Ukraine showed an interest in getting 
involved in the discussions but were not so invited. The initial 
Turkish refusal to accept the offer discredited the European 
Conference as a forum to discuss pan-European issues.
11 As a 
result, the December 1998 Vienna European Council called for a 
revision of the future role and membership of the European 
Conference. Gradually the number of participants has grown. The 
                                                                                                              
only existing and new Member States but also neighbouring countries.’ See e.g. 
‘Making a success of enlargement. Strategy paper and report of the European 
Commission on the progress towards accession by each of the candidate 
countries’, COM (2001) 700 final,13 November 2001, p.1. 
8 Cologne European Council (3-4 June 1999), Bull. EU, 6-1999, point I.50. 
9 Helsinki European Council (10-11 December 1999), Bull. EU, 12-1999, point, 
I.19.56. 
10 Feira European Council (19-20 June 2000), Bull. EU, 6-2000, point I.46.58 
11 M. Maresceau, ‘Pre-Accession’, in M. Cremona, The Enlargement of the 
European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p.29. 
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2000 Nice European Council suggested the incorporation of the 
countries covered by the Stabilisation and Association Process 
together with the EFTA countries. The 2001 Göteborg European 
Council decided to invite Moldova and Ukraine.
12 Notwithstanding 
the general nature of all European Conference declarations and 
their lack of political impact, these meetings might evolve into a 
forum for regular consultations between the Union and its direct 
European  neighbourhood. However, it cannot be denied that its 
general objectives and working methods need improvement and 
clarification.  
 
Apart from the European Conference, the Finnish idea of a 
Northern Dimension was the first worthwhile attempt to overcome 
the somewhat artificial distinction between the enlargement and 
external relations policies of the EU. Notwithstanding a number of 
practical and bureaucratic problems surrounding the 
implementation of the Northern Dimension Action Plan
13, the 
objective of tackling the consequences of uneven regional 
development by stimulating cross-border co-operation provided an 
interesting test-case to avoid the emergence of new dividing lines 
after enlargement. It soon became common ground to suggest the 
extension of this model to the Union’s future borderlands.  
 
In this regard, an ‘eastern dimension’ primarily oriented towards 
Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus and a ‘southern dimension’ towards 
the Mediterranean (non-candidate) countries seemed to be an 
attractive idea. The Member States discussed the issue on the 
occasion of the General Affairs Council of 15 April 2002. Whereas 
Britain wanted to focus on the three new East European neighbours 
Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, other Member States took the view 
that the EU needs a widespread strategy for all neighbour countries 
of the expanded EU, ‘from Russia in the north, in an arc around to 
                                                 
12 These countries participated, together with Russia, ‘on an ad hoc basis’ in the 
Brussels European Conference of 20 October 2001. The same 39 countries came 
together under the Greek presidency (17 April 2003) in order to express their 
views on the relations of the enlarged Union with its neighbours. See: Uniting 
Europe, 28 April 2003, pp. 4-6. 
13 Available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/north_dim/
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Morocco in the South’.
14 In the end, the Member States charged 
Commissioner Chris Patten and CFSP High Representative Javier 
Solana with the task of outlining the bones of a new ‘proximity 
policy’. Both high level policy-makers presented their view in 
September 2002.
15 As a point of departure, they divided the 
Union’s future neighbours into three main regional groupings with 
different perspectives. The western Balkan countries which are 
involved in the Stabilisation and Association Process are 
considered as being ‘potential candidates’ whereas the southern 
Mediterranean countries, included in the Barcelona process, are 
explicitly excluded from membership. Finally, the position of the 
future eastern neighbours
16 remains ambiguous. They ‘fall 
somewhat uncomfortably in between’, which makes this area ‘the 
most immediate challenge’ for the new policy. According to such a 
reasoning, no other neighbouring region will be confronted more 
with the consequences of enlargement. Therefore, the 
Patten/Solana paper suggested that a new ‘proximity policy 
initiative’ should initially focus on the eastern neighbours
17. This 
initiative would, inter alia, embrace the possibility of concluding 
so-called ‘European Neighbourhood Agreements’. Whereas the 
paper remains somewhat vague on the concrete contents and added 
value of this approach, relabelling the existing relations is 
considered to be justified because of its ‘strong symbolism’
18.  
 
Subsequent Council meetings confirmed the perceived necessity to 
focus on Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. For each of these 
countries the Council proposed ‘an ambitious, long-term and 
                                                 
14 B. O’Rourke, ‘EU Commission Ponders Special Relationship with New 
Neighbours’, RFE 19 April 2003. Available at: http://www.rferl.org  
15 The full text of the Patten/Solana paper has been published in Uniting Europe, 
199, 9 September 2002, pp.5-7. 
16 It has to be noticed that, in contrast to the original British proposal, Russia is 
explicitly included in the group of Eastern neighbours. According to the paper ‘it 
is difficult to envisage strengthened regional co-operation without Russia’.  
17 When Patten and Solana stressed the importance of a strong Eastern 
dimension, they did not exclude the Mediterranean nor the western Balkan 
countries from the Union’s general proximity policy. 
18 In the author’s opinion, ‘a new label that marks a strengthened commitment of 
the Union could help to raise the profile of relations with the EU and thus unlock 
additional political will and administrative capacity.’ See footnote 15.   
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integrated approach, with the objective of promoting democratic 
and economic reforms, sustainable development and trade.’
19 The 
Council, however, did not elaborate this approach but invited the 
Commission and the High Representative to draft more detailed 
proposals. However, it was neither Chris Patten nor Javier Solana 
but Commission President Romano Prodi that became the most 
ardent defender of the Union’s proximity policy. Remarkably, 
Prodi distracted the attention away from the New Neighbours 
Initiative to the ‘Wider Europe-Proximity Policy’ concept. In his 
notable speech at the Sixth ECSA World Conference, he defined 
the geographical scope of this new policy as ‘a ring of friends 
surrounding the Union from Morocco to Russia and the Black 
Sea’.
20 A ‘comprehensive approach’ to all neighbours based on the 
prospect of ‘sharing everything but institutions’ can be defined as 
the core of Prodi’s proposal.  
 
The Presidency Conclusions of the following Copenhagen 
European Council of 12 and 13 December 2002 devoted specific 
attention to the relations between the enlarged Union and its 
neighbours. EU enlargement is expected to ‘take forward relations 
with neighbouring countries based on shared political and 
economic values.’ In this regard, ‘the Union remains determined to 
avoid new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and 
prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union.
21’ The 
countries of the western Balkans included in the Stabilisation and 
Association Process are explicitly situated in the zone of potential 
EU enlargement. The other EU neighbours are clearly defined: the 
Presidency Conclusions refer to Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova 
and the southern Mediterranean countries. The envisaged 
Neighbourhood Policy has a long-term perspective and aims the 
promotion of ‘democratic and economic reforms’ as well as 
‘sustainable developments and trade’. Equally, attention will be 
                                                 
19 2463rd Council Meeting - General Affairs, 14183/02, Brussels, 18 Nov. 2002. 
20 R. Prodi, ‘A Wider Europe -a Proximity Policy as the key to stability’, Sixth 
ECSA World Conference, Brussels, 5-6 December 2002, emphasis added, 
Available at: 
 http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/we/intro/index.htm
21 Emphasis added. 
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focused on the further development of cross-border and regional 
cooperation with and among neighbouring countries.  
 
This broad outline of the Union’s Neighbouring Policy requires 
some explanation. Primarily, it is interesting to note the difficulty 
‘to avoid new dividing lines in Europe’, taking into account the 
references to ‘the new borders of the Union’. Furthermore, a level 
of selectivity can be observed: Russia is mentioned first, then the 
other East European countries and finally the southern 
Mediterranean partners. Countries such as Georgia and Armenia 
are neglected (undoubtedly because of relative uncertainties 
surrounding the effective accession of Turkey), whereas also the 
other European non-member states (EFTA-members and micro-
states) are not included. Equally, the EU seems to confirm a new 
differentiation because the countries of the western Balkans 
involved in the Stabilisation and Association Process are clearly 
offered future EU membership perspectives. This question of 
differentiation seems to be a central element of the proposed 
Neighbourhood Policy. In fact, developing an equal strategy for 
both some Republics of the former Soviet Union (so-called 
‘western NIS’) and the countries of the southern Mediterranean 
produces a lot of questions relating to their different political and 
strategic situation, as well as to important economic and socio-
cultural diversities.
22 This differentiation also stems from the 
perspective of legal relations established between the EU and each 
of these countries.  
 
From a legal point of view, long-established relations between the 
EU and its southern periphery led to a number of similar 
agreements (Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements-
EMAAs
23). In the East, Partnership and Co-operation Agreements 
(PCAs) have been concluded with the Russian Federation, Ukraine 
                                                 
22 The European Commission acknowledged these differences in its 
Communication ‘Wider Europe – Neighbourhood  : a new Framework for 
Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, COM (2003) 104 final, 
Brussels, 11 March 2003. 
23 Only the agreement with Syria has still, at the time of writing, to be concluded. 
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and Moldova, whereas the relations with Belarus are still facing a 
deadlock situation.
24
 
The envisaged proximity policy faces the challenge to incorporate 
the divergent political and legal background of EU relations with 
Russia, the southern Mediterranean partners and the western NIS 
into a single comprehensive framework. The internal focus on the 
enlargement negotiations and the Union’s strategy to separate its 
enlargement and external relations policy, which is reflected in the 
organisational structure of the European Commission, also explains 
the difficulties of defining such a consistent approach to the 
southern and eastern peripheries of the EU. 
 
An analysis of this emerging policy would not be complete without 
a reference to the work of the Convention and the drafting of a title 
on ‘The Union and its immediate environment’ in the draft Treaty 
on the establishment of a constitution for Europe (hereinafter 
referred to as the draft constitutional Treaty).  
 
On the basis of this legal and political perspective, it will be 
possible to assess the potential impact of the EU’s emerging 
Neighbourhood Policy on the EMP. In addition, the perceptions of 
the Mediterranean Non-Member Countries (MNMC’s) and 
European neighbouring countries will be taken into account.  
 
I.  The results of the European Convention  
 
The results of the European Convention are of importance with 
regard to the emerging EU's Neighbourhood Policy. Before 
analysing the provisions of the draft Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe
25 it is interesting to provide a short 
                                                 
24 Belarus is now the only European successor state of the former USSR without 
a ratified Partnership and Co-operation Agreement.  
See http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/belarus/intro/index.htm  
and P. Van Elsuwege, ‘EU-Belarus: the Development of a Difficult 
Relationship’, Belarusian Review, 14, 2002, 1, pp.3-10. 
25 Available at: http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf
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overview of the Working Groups’ final reports on legal personality 
and external action which were published in December 2002. The 
first element to be mentioned is that no specific Working Group 
was in charge of discussing the Neighbourhood Policy as such.  
 
A)  The Working Groups’ final reports on legal personality 
and external action 
 
The final report of Working Group VII on ‘External Action’
26 
contains a set of proposals relating to ‘International Agreements’. 
In this respect, the WG recommended the inclusion within the new 
Treaty of ‘one single set of provisions on the negotiation and 
conclusion of international agreements that would indicate that the 
Council authorises the opening of negotiations, issues negotiating 
directives, and concludes the agreements and would indicate who 
would act on the behalf of the EU according to the subject of the 
agreement’. The WG also mentioned in its final report that 
conferring ‘one single explicit legal personality on the Union’ 
would ‘clarify the possibility for the Union to conclude agreements 
in the field of its competences’. 
 
The final report of WG III on ‘legal personality’
27 also favoured 
this option and therefore recommended the ‘consolidation of the 
various applicable procedures in a single provision’, the principle 
being that ‘whatever the area concerned, it is always the Council 
which: 
 
-  authorises the opening of negotiations and issues the 
negotiating directives, and 
-   concludes the agreements once they are negotiated’. 
 
The WG III however clearly stressed that ‘consolidation into a 
single article might not necessarily involve changes to the specific 
features of the procedure according to the subject in hand’. 
                                                 
26 Final Report of Working Group VII on External Action, Brussels, 16 
December 2002, CONV 459/02, p. 9. 
27 Final report of Working Group III on Legal Personality, Brussels, 1 October 
2002, CONV 305/02. 
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The main objective was in fact to simplify and clarify the 
procedure of negotiation and conclusion of international 
agreements concluded by the EC (and its Member States), on the 
one hand, and the Union on the other hand. In other words, the idea 
was to regroup a set of provisions:  
 
-  Article 300 EC Treaty (conclusion procedure for 
agreements between the EC and third states or international 
organisations); 
-  Article 24 EU Treaty (agreements in the field of the CFSP); 
-  Article 38 EU Treaty (agreements in the framework of 
police and judicial co-operation in penal matters). 
 
As we will see, these proposals were taken into account for the 
writing of the articles of the draft constitutional Treaty. What is 
important to understand here is that there was a consensus between 
the two Working Groups to simplify the provisions concerning the 
negotiations and conclusion of international agreements, including 
the expected future ‘(specific) neighbourhood association 
agreements’.  
 
B)  The main articles of the project relating to the emerging 
Neighbourhood Policy 
 
Among the various articles of the draft constitutional treaty dealing 
with the external relations of the EC or the EU one may identify 
five which are of particular importance regarding the emergence of 
EU's Neighbourhood Policy. One must however underline the fact 
that the formula ‘Neighbourhood Policy’ is not expressly 
mentioned within the Treaty itself. The members of the Convention 
favoured a more neutral designation: ‘the Union and its immediate 
environment’. 
 
1.  The introduction of a specific title devoted to the ‘Union 
and its immediate environment’ within the framework of the 
first part of the draft constitutional Treaty 
 
The introduction of a specific title (title VIII) devoted to the ‘Union 
and its immediate environment’ within the framework of the first 
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part of the draft constitutional Treaty is undoubtedly a major 
innovation. The fact that such a title was inserted within the first 
part of the draft Treaty (i.e the ‘real constitutional provisions
28‘) 
highlights the importance given to the development of new 
privileged relations between an enlarged Union and its periphery. 
 
This title is composed of a single article (Art. 56) also entitled ‘The 
Union and its immediate environment’. It is noteworthy to stress 
that in the previous version of the draft Treaty, the wording of this 
article (at that time Art. 42) was different: ‘Privileged relations 
between the Union and Neighbouring States’
29. Why such a 
tremendous change in the formulation occurred is not very clear. 
 
The new article 56 is divided into two short paragraphs. The first 
reads as follows: ‘1. The Union shall develop a special relationship 
with neighbouring States, aiming to establish an area of prosperity 
and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and 
characterised by close and peaceful relations based on co-
operation’
30. 
 
The aim of this first paragraph is obviously to define the general 
objectives of the relations between the enlarged EU and its 
immediate environment and to characterise its very nature: i.e. a 
‘special relationship’. ‘Good neighbourliness’ must be put in 
parallel with the specific Stabilisation and Association Process 
(SAP) for the countries of south-eastern Europe (see infra). 
According to this first paragraph, such a relation should be 
‘founded on the values of the Union’. This is an implicit reference 
to EU’s conditionality strategy reflecting also, to some extent, the 
will of the EU to export its ‘political model’.  
 
Even if the implementation of an EU Neighbourhood Policy is not 
explicitly mentioned, this was clearly the objective of the members 
                                                 
28 The second part is devoted to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union 
the third to the policies and functioning of the Union and the fourth to the 
general and final provisions.  
29 See Preliminary Draft Constitutional Treaty’, CONV 369/02, 28 October 
2002. 
30 Emphasis added. 
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of the Convention. The explanatory note, published by the 
Secretariat of the Convention on this article in April 2003, states 
without any ambiguity that the first paragraph ‘sets out the Union's 
intention to establish a ‘neighbourhood’ policy. There is no 
equivalent article/provisions in the current treaties, although the 
description in this paragraph could accurately be applied to the 
existing situation (the Union already has contractual relations with 
most of its immediate neighbours). The proposed text provides a 
loose but coherent framework for relations with its neighbours’
31. 
Indeed flexibility is a key word characterising this first paragraph. 
Such a flexibility is also required in order to apply a strong 
differentiation of treatment among the target countries. 
 
2. The possibility to conclude new ‘specific (association) 
agreements’ 
 
The second paragraph relates to the contractual aspects of the 
envisaged relationship: ‘2. For this purpose, the Union may 
conclude and implement specific agreements with the countries 
concerned in accordance with Article III-227. These agreements 
may contain reciprocal rights and obligations as well as the 
possibility of undertaking activities jointly. Their implementation 
shall be the subject of periodic consultation’. 
 
The essential aim of the second paragraph is to provide a legal 
basis for the bilateral contractual relations of the EU with its 
neighbours. The reference to ‘reciprocal rights and obligations’ is 
derived from the former Article 310 EC
32, the legal basis of the 
Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements and the association 
agreements aiming at establishing a Customs Union concluded with 
Malta, Cyprus and Turkey. For their part, countries benefiting from 
PCA's could expect to benefit from a new form of contractual 
relationship (the association) within the framework of the 
                                                 
31 Explanatory note ‘Title IX: The Union and its immediate environment’?, The 
European Convention, The Secretariat, Brussels, 2 April 2003, CONV 649/03. 
32 Article 310 EC (Nice version): ‘The Community may conclude with one or 
more States or international organisations agreements establishing an association 
involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special 
procedure.’ 
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envisaged policy. The ‘periodic consultation’ foreseen in the last 
sentence is also provided for under association agreements through 
the Association Councils and Association Committees. An explicit 
link is also made with the provisions of Article III-227 constituting 
the new single framework for negotiating and concluding 
International Agreements. 
 
All in all, this article 56 and consequently title VIII, is more a 
framework provision, a political declaration of intent rather than a 
proper legally binding provision. To give a constitutional 
foundation to the emerging Neighbourhood Policy is however of 
great political significance as a new pyramid of privileges in the 
external relations of the EC and the EU will be established after the 
next enlargement and the adoption of the Constitutional Treaty by 
the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). The absence of a clear 
vision or even definition of the expected ‘Neighbourhood Policy’, 
should be taken into account within the framework of the IGC even 
if the new title may, in its present state, be sufficient to develop 
progressively an ambitious Neighbourhood Policy of the enlarged 
European Union.
33  
 
Finally, it is important to mention that the most popular amendment 
to Article 56, proposed by several Members of the Convention 
during the last meetings, referred to the possibility of inserting an 
explicit reference to the Council of Europe
34. The parliamentary 
assembly of the Council of Europe did not miss the opportunity to 
draw the attention of the Convention. In a resolution, published in 
January 2003, its members suggested that, regarding the new title 
devoted to ‘The Union and its immediate environment’, the 
opportunity could not be ‘lost to capitalise on the role that the 
Council of Europe would have to play in such a scheme, owing to 
                                                 
33 The European Parliament Draft Report on ‘Wider Europe - Neighbourhood : a 
New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’ 
explicitly mentioned that ‘the article on the neighbouring countries in the draft 
Constitution needs to be strengthened at the next IGC’, C5-0110/2003, 25 Sept. 
2003, p.11.   
34 http://european-convention.eu.int/Docs/Treaty/pdf/42/global42.pdf
It is noteworthy that the European Parliament also advocates ‘closer cooperation 
with the Council of Europe’. See footnote 33.  
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its pan-European character and the fact that all its member states 
co-operate on an equal footing. The Convention on the Future of 
Europe should take this state of affairs into account and give 
priority to making full use of this institution, rather than setting up 
new bodies or other institutional arrangements, which would result 
in duplication of efforts and wasted resources’
35. We will see, in 
the near future, if the IGC will take into account this concrete 
proposal. Avoiding possible conflicts of competences by 
establishing institutional links with the main regional organisations 
of the area concerned should, in any case, be a priority for the 
Union. Multilateralisation of the neighbourhood initiative is to be 
taken into account. 
 
C)  Other articles of interest: Association Agreements and 
their procedures of negotiation and conclusion 
 
Within the framework of the third part of the draft constitutional 
Treaty devoted to ‘the policies and functioning of the Union’, apart 
from the general articles III-193 and III-194
36 defining respectively 
the principles and main objectives of the Union's action on the 
international scene and referring to the Common Strategies to be 
adopted by the European Council, two articles (III-226, III-227) are 
of practical interest for the implementation of the Neighbourhood 
Policy. According to Article III-226 (inserted within chapter VI 
International Agreements): ‘The Union may conclude association 
agreements with one or more third countries or international 
organisations. Such agreements shall establish an association 
involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common actions and 
special procedures’. This new proposal is in fact a copy of the 
present Article 310 EC on which are based the Euro-Mediterranean 
                                                 
35 Resolution 1314 (2003), ‘Contribution of the Council of Europe to the 
constitution-making process of the European Union’, Assembly debate on 29 
January 2003 (4th Sitting) Text adopted by the Assembly on 29 January 2003 
(4th Sitting, See also the Note of the Council of Europe, transmitted by Mr 
Jacques Santer, member of the Convention, CONV 157/02, Brussels, 25 June 
2002, page 7 available at: 
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/fr/02/cv00/00157f2.pdf. 
36Title V ‘The Union's external action’. 
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Association Agreements. Article III-226 could therefore be the 
legal basis for concluding new agreements within the framework of 
the Neighbourhood Policy. In other words, the possibility to 
conclude ‘specific agreements’, as stated in article 56, is still quite 
vague. No paragraph was added to the former version of Article 
310 EC in order to define more precisely these ‘specific 
agreements’. The Patten/Solana paper suggestion that a new 
‘proximity policy initiative’ could embrace the possibility of 
concluding ‘European Neighbourhood Agreements’ was therefore 
not clearly reflected in the draft constitutional Treaty. 
 
Article III-227, which is explicitly mentioned in Article 56 
foreseeing the neighbourhood policy (see supra), is designed to 
consolidate, within a single framework, the procedures relating to 
the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements as it was 
proposed by the Working Groups on legal personality and external 
action. We cannot anticipate the results of the next IGC, but if this 
new legal framework is adopted by the Member States this will 
have an important impact on the external actions of the EU and the 
EC. On the one hand, more consistency and clarity is expected. On 
the other hand, one might fear a sort of dilution of a privileged 
neighbourhood relationship within the broader general external 
relations framework. This is probably the reason why a specific 
title (title VIII) devoted to the ‘Union and its immediate 
environment’ was inserted within the framework of the first part of 
the draft constitutional Treaty. 
 
II. The proposals of the European Commission and its 
President 
 
The lack of a well-substantiated policy to tackle issues such as 
trade diversion, regional and cross-border co-operation has been 
criticised heavily in academic discourse. A growing number of 
experts warn against the potential dangers of new dividing lines in 
Europe, dividing lines that would no longer be based on ideological 
differences but rather on economic and social asymmetries.
37  
                                                 
37 I. Kempe, W. Van Meurs, ‘Strategic Challenges and Risks of EU 
Enlargement’ in I. Kempe (ed.), Beyond EU Enlargement: The Agenda of Direct 
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The EU approach to this challenge has been described as 
‘disconcerting and disappointing’
38, particularly because of a 
perceived reluctance on the side of the EU to make a link between 
enlargement on the one hand and its general external relations 
policy on the other. 
 
With the prospect of the end of the accession negotiations the 
European Commission could no longer ignore the consequences of 
enlargement for its ‘near abroad’. 
 
A)  The first proposals  
 
Since the publication of its Work Programme for 2002, the 
European Commission has announced its intention to elaborate a 
new proximity policy: ‘the Euro-Mediterranean policy will have to 
be part of a broader, coherent and active policy aimed at all our 
neighbours, in an arc stretching through Russia and Ukraine to the 
Mediterranean. In this context, there will be an opportunity later in 
the year to take stock of progress on developing the Northern 
Dimension of EU policies. As far as the western Balkans are 
concerned, the Commission will continue working in support of 
peace and reconstruction’
 39. It was already clear at this time that: 
 
-  Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean partners were the target-
countries; 
-  the western Balkans were dissociated from the Neighbourhood 
Policy as such.  
 
In May 2002, the Commission members of the Convention 
proposed a ‘Communication from the Commission to the 
                                                                                                              
Neighbourhood for Eastern Europe (vol.1), (Gütersloh, Bertelsmann Foundation, 
2001), pp.33-36.  
38 M. Maresceau, ‘EU-Central and Eastern Europe Relations at a Turning Point’, 
(1997) 7 R.A.E - L.E.A., p.265. 
39 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 
- The Commission's Work Programme for 2002, COM(2001)620 final, Brussels, 
5 December 2001. 
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Convention: A project for the European Union’.
40 This 
Communication does not contain any specific developments 
concerning the future Neighbourhood Policy. However, it is 
possible to observe certain evolutions towards the ‘external 
dimension of the European space of liberty, security and justice.’ 
The Communication underlines that ‘the external dimension of 
these actions is particularly important, for it will add to the close 
and privileged relations the Union intends to cultivate with its 
neighbours.  
 
The Union has a significant contribution to make in four areas: 
 
-  Collective action must permit the introduction of common 
measures of control and surveillance of our external 
borders, (…) 
-  Implementing genuine common policies on immigration and 
asylum, 
-  Effective action against organised crime and terrorism.’
 41. 
 
Moreover, this Communication states that ‘the Union's immediate 
neighbourhood, to the south and to the east, is the first port of call 
for a common external policy, (…). If it is to grow stronger, the 
Union's foreign policy must have a decision-making capacity with 
regard to security and defence - this at a time when, after the cold 
war, the deployment of forces in outside theatres in the service of 
peace is becoming as important as the notion of common defence 
itself’
42 It is significant to see that some members of the 
Commission
43 still essentially perceive the neighbouring countries 
from a hard and soft security perspective
44. This position is not 
necessarily shared by its President (see infra). 
                                                 
40 Communication from the Commission - A project for the European Union, 
COM(2002)247 final, Brussels, 3 September 2002, CONV 229/02, CONTRIB 
78. 
41 Ibid., 12. 
42 See footnote 40, p. 15. 
43 The Communication was transmitted by MM. Barnier and Vitorino in the 
name of the Commission. 
44 Another example of focussing on security issues was given by the final report 
of the working Group on defence within the framework of the European 
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In the framework of the Sixth ECSA world conference on peace, 
stability and security, taking place one week before the December 
2002 Copenhagen European Council, Romano Prodi elaborated his 
own ambitious views in a speech entitled ‘A Wider Europe – A 
Proximity Policy as the key to stability’.
 45 He stressed the ‘need for 
a new political perspective on relations with our southern and 
eastern neighbours. (…).’ ‘We need to find solutions that will allow 
us to share the advantages of enlargement with our neighbours. 
(…) I want to see a ‘ring of friends’ surrounding the Union and its 
closest European neighbours, from Morocco to Russia and the 
Black Sea.’ Particularly the expression ‘ring of friends’ is very 
symbolic in this regard. Apart from using symbols, the 
Commission President envisages ‘some kind of Copenhagen 
proximity criteria’ and underlines that ‘progress cannot be made 
unless the countries concerned take adequate measures to adopt 
the relevant acquis’.  
 
A ‘comprehensive approach’ to all neighbours based on the 
prospect of ‘sharing everything but institutions’ can be defined as 
the core of Prodi’s proposal. In this regard, the Commission 
President supports the idea of a ‘Common European Economic 
Space’  that ‘ could provide a framework in which we could 
ultimately share everything but institutions’. He explicitly refers to 
the ‘EEA model [which] does not presuppose accession as a pre-
requisite’ and immediately specifies that ‘as history shows, being 
member of the EEA does not exclude membership of the EU at a 
later date.’ 
 
Contrary to what could be expected, the December 2002 
Commission Communication on the institutional architecture: ‘For 
the European Union: peace, freedom, solidarity’
46 does not contain 
any further developments regarding a new Neighbourhood Policy. 
In contrast, the feasibility study of the Commission, known as the 
                                                                                                              
Convention where the concepts of ‘Global insecurity’, and the ‘New threat’ were 
given particular importance. 
45 http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/offtext/sp051202_fr.htm  
46 For the European Union: peace, freedom, solidarity - Communication of the 
Commission on the institutional architecture, COM(2002)728 final, Brussels, 4 
December 2002. 
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Pénélope document
47, published simultaneously with the above 
mentioned Communication and realised under the impulse of its 
President Romano Prodi, contains an Article 27 entitled ‘Relations 
with neighbouring States’, which states that ‘The Union shall 
establish privileged relations with its neighbouring states by means 
of association agreements.’ 
 
A number of conclusions can be drawn. First, the notion 
‘neighbouring state’ is the common denominator of the proposed 
Convention articles and the study of the Commission. Second, the 
notion ‘privileged relations’ initially appeared in the two proposals 
but was amended in the final version of the draft Treaty (see 
supra). Equally, the concept of ‘association’ can also be found 
twice but none of these proposals deals in details with the question 
whether and how new forms of association could be developed. 
 
B)  The Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament: ‘Wider Europe - 
Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our 
Eastern and Southern Neighbours’ (11 March 2003) 
 
The most important step in the European Commission’s definition 
of a neighbourhood strategy is certainly the Communication from 
the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: 
‘Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations 
with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’ (11 March 2003).
48
 
According to the Commission ‘Russia, the countries of the western 
NIS and the southern Mediterranean should be offered the prospect 
of a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and further integration and 
liberalisation to promote the free movement of - persons, goods, 
services and capital (four freedoms).’ This offer clearly reflects the 
                                                 
47 ‘European Commission feasibility study - contribution to a preliminary draft’, 
Working document, 04/12/2002, 
http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/offtext/const051202_en.pdf  
48 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament. ‘Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: a new Framework for Relations 
with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, COM (2003) 104 final, Brussels, 11 
March 2003. 
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objective of Romano Prodi’s discourse. Without going into detail, 
it is possible to summarise the main elements of the proposal in the 
following way:  
  
-  Extension of the Internal Market; 
-  Preferential trade relations and access to the market; 
-  Perspectives in terms of legal migrations and movements of 
persons; 
-  Intensification of the co-operation aiming at combating 
common threats to security; 
-  A reinforced role played by the EU regarding conflict 
prevention and crisis management; 
-  Promotion of human rights, intensification of cultural co-
operation and mutual understanding; 
-  Integration into European road, energy and 
telecommunications networks and to the European Research 
Area; 
-  New instruments for promoting and securing investments; 
-  Assistance in order to allow the insertion within the 
international trade system; 
-  Increase of the efficiency of co-operation; 
-  New sources of financing. 
 
The strategy is clearly global, encompassing political, economic 
and human issues. The influence of the Barcelona Declaration is 
obvious here.  
 
More details are also given regarding the possibility of concluding 
new ‘neighbourhood agreements’. According to the Commission's 
point of view these new agreements ‘would supplement existing 
contractual relations where the EU and the neighbouring country 
have moved beyond the existing framework, taking on new 
entitlements and obligations. If, however, the Neighbourhood 
Agreements contain provisions going beyond those of the Euro- 
Mediterranean Association Agreements, similar arrangements 
could be offered, on equivalent terms, to the Mediterranean 
partners.’
49 In other words, it seems that the European Commission 
                                                 
49 Ibid., p. 18  
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is currently trying to influence the intergovernmental meetings by 
drawing attention to the necessity to define a calendar for 
negotiating and concluding these new agreements. 
 
The Commission insists on a ‘differentiated and progressive 
approach’. The long-term goal is to move towards ‘an 
arrangement whereby the Union’s relations with the neighbouring 
countries ultimately resemble the close political and economic links 
currently enjoyed with the European Economic Area’. 
Furthermore, the new Neighbourhood Policy ‘should not override 
the existing framework for EU relations with Russia and the 
countries of the western NIS, and the southern Mediterranean. 
Instead, it would supplement and build on existing policies and 
arrangements.’
50
 
The Council, in its meeting of 12 June 2003, supported this 
approach and invited the Commission, inter alia, to ‘present a 
communication on a new Neighbourhood Instrument, focusing on 
promoting sustainable economic and social development of the 
bordering countries and pursuing regional and trans-national co-
operation, including people-to-people contacts, and on ensuring 
the smooth functioning and secure management of the Eastern and 
Mediterranean borders, based on the evaluation of existing 
instruments and as an integral part of the consideration of the 
relevant financing instruments in the new financial perspectives 
after 2006.’
51
 
C)  The Communication from the Commission on ‘Paving 
the way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument’ (July 2003) 
 
In its July 2003 Communication ‘Paving the way for a New 
Neighbourhood Instrument’
52, the European Commission answered 
this request and recognised the existing difficulties and limits of the 
                                                 
50  Ibid., p. 16. 
51 Council Conclusions on Wider Europe - New Neighbourhood, Brussels, 12 
June 2003, 10447/03. 
52 Communication from the Commission. Paving the way for a New 
Neighbourhood Instrument, Brussels, 1 July 2003, COM(2003) 393 final. 
45  
current legal frameworks and procedures for regional co-operation. 
At present, the management of ‘co-operation on the external and 
future external borders of the Union is supported by a variety of 
instruments’ operating under divergent regulations and procedures. 
The INTERREG Community Initiative supports cross-border co-
operation among Member States and neighbouring countries, but 
these funds can only be used inside the Union. The PHARE 
programme focuses on co-operation between Member States and 
the candidate countries, whereas the TACIS programme operates 
on the western border regions of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and 
Moldova. In the Mediterranean, the MEDA programme supports 
bilateral and regional co-operation. The Communication also 
includes CARDS, the key instrument of the Stabilisation and 
Association Process, even though the western Balkans fall outside 
the scope of the Wider Europe Communication.  
 
This diversity of instruments and procedures complicates the 
implementation of joint projects and calls for ‘a single approach to 
co-operation across the external borders of the Union.’ According 
to the Commission Communication, the new Neighbourhood 
Instrument offers the opportunity to develop such an approach. 
This new Instrument, however, raises a number of significant legal 
and budgetary problems, stemming from the present separation 
between external and internal funding sources. Furthermore, the 
current financial perspectives extend to the end of 2006 and a lot of 
financial commitments have already been made up to that date.  
 
Consequently, the Commission proposes a ‘two-step approach’. In 
an initial phase, between 2004 and 2006, the existing legal 
framework will continue to apply but the Commission will seek 
ways to improve the co-ordination of the current procedures. In this 
regard, the introduction of ‘Neighbourhood Programmes’ has been 
proposed. Such Programmes ‘would permit a single application 
process, including a single call for proposals covering both sides of 
the border, and would have a joint selection process for projects.’ 
From 2007 onwards, this temporary solution would lead to the 
establishment of a new Neighbourhood Instrument. The road to this 
new legal instrument is not very clear. The Commission 
distinguishes three options, which ‘require further study (…) to 
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assess their feasibility and the impact that they have on co-
operation along the external borders.’ The most far-reaching and 
innovative option would be to create a single new Regulation, 
based on a single budget line, to fund activities both inside and 
outside the Union. Alternative options imply either the expansion 
of the content and geographical scope of an existing co-operation 
instrument (e.g. permitting the use of INTERREG funds outside the 
Union) or the continued co-ordination of the already existing 
instruments on the basis of the proposed Neighbourhood 
Programmes. The introduction of these Programmes is the first 
priority for the Commission and implies, inter alia, the amendment 
of the INTERREG guidelines ‘to add the southern regions of 
Spain, France, Italy and Greece as eligible for co-operation 
activities with the southern Mediterranean partners so as to allow 
bilateral cross-border co-operation.’  
 
Whereas these proposals all have a long-term perspective and lack 
some tangible content, the European Commission has also adopted, 
in August 2003, two concrete proposals for regulations on ‘local 
border traffic’
53, which has been defined as ‘the crossing of 
borders by nationals of third countries who live in border areas 
and regularly travel for legitimate reasons to a Member State of 
the Union without constituting a threat to security.’ This issue is 
highly relevant in order to ensure that the new external border will 
not be barrier to trade, social and cultural interaction or regional co-
operation. It is, in other words, a vital part of the Union’s proximity 
agenda. Most of the new neighbours are countries whose nationals 
must be in possession of a visa when entering the EU. Moreover, as 
a consequence of the gradual implementation of the Schengen 
acquis, border controls will also remain in place between the new 
Member States and current Member States, as well as between the 
new Member States themselves. This so-called ‘temporary external 
borders’ regime will only be lifted following a unanimous Council 
                                                 
53 European Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment 
of a regime of local border traffic at the external land borders of the Member 
States, and, Proposal on the establishment of a regime of local border traffic at 
the temporary external land borders between Member States, COM(2003) 502 
final, 14. Aug. 2003. 
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decision, in accordance with Article 3 of the Act of Accession. 
Given the importance of local border traffic and the absence of a 
clear and coherent legislative framework regulating this issue, the 
Commission considers it appropriate to apply a facilitating border 
crossing regime for border residents. In this regard, specific ‘local 
traffic visas’
54 would be introduced for citizens of neighbouring 
countries who want to work or visit family members in an ‘adjacent 
border area inside the EU’. This very attractive model, which 
seems to be inspired by the Kaliningrad facilitated travel document, 
only applies to border residents crossing the land borders of the 
Union. Consequently, only the citizens of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus 
and the western Balkan countries are likely to benefit from this new 
regime if the Commission proposals should be adopted by the 
Council after consultation of the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions. In other words, this facilitating border crossing regime 
will not apply for the Mediterranean region. It can be argued, 
however, that all the elements constituting the rationale for this 
initiative - i.e. the existence of long-established economic, social 
and cultural ties between acceding countries and new neighbours, 
and the objective to avoid new dividing lines after enlargement – 
are also relevant for the southern Mediterranean. 
 
In less than two years, the Commission and its President have 
progressively identified the main contours of the ambitious new 
Neighbourhood Policy. At operational level a Wider Europe Task 
Force  has been created under the political leadership of 
enlargement Commissioner Günter Verheugen. This Task Force 
will be in charge of further developing the concept and of drawing 
up action plans with each of the countries involved
55. New forms of 
neighbourhood co-operation are already envisaged for the years to 
                                                 
54 The visa would allow multiple entries with a maximum stay of seven 
consecutive days. The total period of residence cannot exceed three months 
within a half year. The visa would have a minimum validity of one year and a 
maximum of five years. 
55 See ‘Commission decides on further steps to develop its ‘Wider Europe’ 
policy’,  IP/03/963 - Brussels, 09 July 2003, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/we/intro/ip03_963.htm 
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come. The fact that such a policy could be constitutionalised at the 
highest level is also of importance.  
 
III.  The initial reaction of the European Parliament: the EP 
as an advocate of the EU's southern Partners?  
  
The European Parliament (EP), in a preliminary reaction
56, 
welcomed the Commission communications and outlined its own 
vision on the emerging Neighbourhood Policy. Contrary to the 
Patten/Solana paper (see supra), the EP document clearly promotes 
the southern dimension of the envisaged policy. It stresses the 
importance of strengthened relations with the Mediterranean 
partners and the Middle East ‘in parallel to [the Union’s] 
heightened presence in the eastern part of the European continent.’ 
The EP subscribes to the objectives of the December 2002 
Copenhagen European Council (i.e. ‘the avoidance of new dividing 
lines after enlargement’) and uses the terminology of Commission 
President Romano Prodi (e.g. ‘circle of friends’). The Parliament, 
however, presents a much more ambitious project, including a 
strong institutional framework and a series of common policies. 
Furthermore, the EP proposes an extension of the initial 
geographical scope, in order to ensure real ‘territorial continuity’ 
of a ‘pan-European and Mediterranean region’.  
  
In contrast to the Commission proposals, this approach implies the 
inclusion of the southern Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia) and the observer countries of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (Libya
57 and Mauritania)
58. A further extension towards 
the wider Middle East and the countries of the Gulf Cooperation 
                                                 
56 At the time of writing, only the draft report of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy was available 
(Rapporteur: Pasqualina Napoletano). Draft Report on ‘Wider Europe - 
Neighbourhood : a New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern 
Neighbours’, C5-0110/2003, 25 Sept. 2003.  
57 Concerning Libya it has to be mentioned that the Commission framework 
Communication (see footnote 48) stipulates that ‘the EU should give 
consideration to how it could incorporate Libya into the Neighbourhood Policy’.   
58 Both countries are also founding members of the Arab Maghreb Union 
(AMU).   
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Council (GCC) is considered to be of strategic importance in the 
medium to long term.
59 The document explicitly refers to countries 
such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran but fails to include Pakistan and 
India, which are part of the same strategic equation. The question 
is, of course, whether this wider area ‘from Marrakech to 
Bangladesh’
60 is still manageable within the framework of a ‘Wider 
Europe – Neighbourhood Policy’. Furthermore, the EP also ‘calls 
for particular attention to be paid to those European countries, 
which, by reason of size or choice, have not participated in the 
Union’s enlargement process (Andorra, Switzerland, Norway, 
Iceland, Liechtenstein).’
61 Finally, the EP ‘believes that the 
involvement of the western Balkan countries in a new overarching 
neighbourhood policy could entail their participation in the Euro-
Mediterranean partnership’. The association of these countries, 
which have been granted membership perspectives,
62 could counter 
the perception that the new Neighbourhood Policy is devised as an 
alternative to accession (see infra). In this regard, the EP explicitly 
mentioned that the enlargement policy remains a distinct process.
63
 
In addition to a wider geographical scope, the Parliament report 
proposes the conceptualisation of the new Neighbourhood Policy 
into three common political areas, including (i) a political, human, 
                                                 
59 The explanatory statement explicitly refers to ‘the vast energy resources’ of 
this region. See footnote 56. 
60 See ‘The New Transatlantic Project’, by Ronald D. Asmus (GMF 
Transatlantic Fellow) and Kenneth M. Pollack, Policy Review, 
October/November, 2002, available at http://www.gmfus.org/   
61 See footnote 56, p.7. Strikingly, the EP ignored three micro-states  : San 
Marino,  Monaco and the Holy See.  
62 The Presidency Conclusions of the Feira European Council (19-20 June 2000) 
for the first time described the Western Balkan countries as ‘potential candidates 
for EU Membership’ Bull. EU, 6-2000, point I.49.66. The December 2002 
Copenhagen European Council reaffirmed the vocation of these countries to 
become EU Member States and the March 2003 Brussels European Council 
explicitly stated that ‘the future of the Western Balkans is within the EU’, Bull. 
EU, 3-2003, point I.47.82. 
63 See footnote 56, p.12.  The EP Working Document laid down that “we need to 
ensure that this ‘ring of friends’ approach does not turn into a crude argument 
between those who say that ‘neighbouring country’ means ‘a country destined 
never to join the EU’ and those who believe that the prospect of joining the EU is 
the only way of achieving closer cooperation”.  
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civil, and cultural area; (ii) a security area (internal and external); 
and (iii) an area for sustainable economic and social co-
development.
64 The objective of this idea is obviously to dismantle 
the three-pillar structure of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
(i.e. the political and security partnership; the economic and 
financial partnership and the social, cultural and human 
partnership) in order to avoid a marginalisation of the third basket 
and a disproportional focus on economic and financial aspects. 
Interestingly, the EP introduces the concept of co-development, 
which is one of the basic elements of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership, and proposes, inter alia, a common monetary policy 
and a common employment policy.  
 
The organisation of the Neighbourhood Policy into different policy 
areas, including specific common policies, is to be based on 
adequate funding from the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) and the European Investment Bank (EIB). In 
order to ensure maximum effect, the EP considers a further 
conceptualisation into a bilateral, sub-regional and regional 
dimension, including the Northern Dimension, the Mediterranean 
region and - in contrast to the Commission proposals - cooperation 
in the Black Sea area. In addition, the EP advocates close 
cooperation with the Council of Europe and the OSCE, which 
could be extended to the countries of the Mediterranean and the 
Middle East, promotes the development of the European 
Conference into ‘a permanent body of the New Neighbourhood 
Policy’ and foresees the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean 
Parliamentary Assembly.
65 This approach is not very consistent. 
The EP gives only an overview of four possible options but fails to 
define a preference. On the other hand, the analysis of the EP’s first 
reaction reveals a commitment to develop a balanced approach to 
all the neighbours of the enlarged EU. It can be argued that the 
vision of the EP is even more ambitious and wide-ranging than that 
of the Commission and its President. However, everything remains 
to be done.  
                                                 
64 See footnote 56., p.8.  
65 ibid., pp.9-10.   
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The association and consultation of the neighbours of the enlarged 
European Union to the definition of this project is fundamental. 
This project must become a real common project in order to 
maximise its potential positive impact on the stability and the 
security of the whole area. 
 
IV.  The potential impact of the EU's Emerging 
Neighbourhood Policy on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
 
The next enlargement has a Mediterranean flavour, as three current 
Mediterranean partners of the EU are also candidate countries. 
Cyprus and Malta will become Member States in 2004 while 
Turkey is still waiting for the start of the accession negotiations. 
Therefore, before analysing the potential impact of the EU's 
emerging Neighbourhood Policy on the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership, it is necessary to briefly evaluate the potential impact 
of the next enlargement on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. 
 
A)  From 12 to 9 Mediterranean Partners: the impact of the 
third ‘Mediterranean enlargement’ 
 
The fact that two (Cyprus, Malta) and then three (Turkey) 
Mediterranean partners will leave the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership implies, among other things:  
 
-    the passage from 12 to 9 Mediterranean Non-Member 
Countries (MNMC's) and the passage from 27 (15 Member 
States + 12 MNMC's) to 37 Euro-Mediterranean partners 
(13 candidates
66, 15 present Member States, 9 MNMC's)
67. 
The future equation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
will therefore be: 28 Member States on the one hand and 9 
                                                 
66 Including Cyprus and Malta. 
67 During the Euro-Mediterranean Mid-Term Meeting of Foreign Ministers, held 
in May 2003, a substantial change occurred ‘since the membership of the (Euro-
Mediterranean) partnership grew from 27 to 35.partners’, 15 Member States + 10 
acceding countries (including Cyprus and Malta) + 10 Mediterranean partners 
(i.e. still including Turkey) See Presidency Conclusions of the mid-term Euro-
Mediterranean Foreign Ministers’ meeting. 
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(or 10 with Libya) MNMC's on the other hand. The 
imbalance is noticeable, as the weight of the MNMC's will 
be considerably reduced within such a new EMP; 
 
-  that the trade relationships with the MNMC's will be 
(temporarily?) limited to free trade zones as Cyprus, Malta 
and Turkey were the only MNMC's benefiting from an 
Agreement based on a Customs Union (on the other hand 
the relationship with the MNMC's will be more 
homogeneous); 
 
-  that the EMP will be limited to a relationship between eight 
Arab countries plus Israel on the one hand, and the Member 
States of the enlarged Union on the other hand. Such a 
Euro-Arab-Israeli relation might raise some difficulties and 
even ‘contaminate’ the Barcelona process in case of Arab-
Israeli crisis or conflicts. The evolution from a 
‘Mediterranean policy’ to an ‘Arab-Israeli’ policy of the EU 
will certainly be one of the most important challenges. 
Eberhard Rhein, former Director in charge of the Euro-
Mediterranean relations when the Barcelona process was 
launched, even suggested excluding Israel from the EMP
68. 
Indeed a very provocative suggestion. One must however 
never forget that the Barcelona process remains one of the 
few forums where Israel and its Arab neighbours have 
regular high level meetings
69. 
 
The next enlargement will therefore undoubtedly mark the end of 
some specificities of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as 
conceived in 1995. In this respect, the accession of Turkey is 
indeed one of the key factors. In terms of population, the accession 
of Turkey means for the MNMC's a loss of more than 70 million 
people
70. In terms of trade flows one should stress that, according 
                                                 
68 Oral intervention within the framework of the annual EuroMeSCo Conference 
held in Paris in February 2002. 
69 With the noticeable exception of the Marseille Euro-Mediterranean 
Conference of December 2000 when Syria and Lebanon boycotted the meetings. 
70 68 million people (figures for 2003). CIA world Fact book. 
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to the figures released by EUROSTAT for 2001, the EU conducted 
7.1% of its total external trade with the Mediterranean Partners. 
Between 1995 and 2001, EU imports from the Mediterranean 
Partners grew by 110% whereas EU imports from the Partners rose 
by 49%. Together Turkey, Israel and Algeria accounted for more 
than 60% of EU-Mediterranean trade. The economic impact of the 
accession of Turkey on the Mediterranean will thus be very 
important comparing to the accession of Cyprus of Malta.  
 
Until its accession, Turkey could also play a very important role in 
the establishment of the Neighbourhood Policy. This is the reason 
why the Commission, in March 2003, clearly proposed to foster 
‘Regional integration (…) through the rapid negotiation and 
implementation of FTAs between the Mediterranean partners, as 
well as with the EU’s customs union partner Turkey’
71. 
 
Moreover, the accession of Turkey to the EU means that the enlarged 
Union will have new borders with Armenia, Georgia, Iran, Iraq and 
Syria. This will generate considerable geopolitical implications for the 
whole region. In this regard, Romano Prodi stressed that while ‘looking 
further east, the EU should develop a new regional strategy that 
embraces Iraq, Iran and Syria. Only this kind of approach can lay 
the foundations for lasting stability and Security’
72. Surprisingly 
Syria is mentioned alongside Iraq and Iran. What Romano Prodi 
means by this tripartite association remains to be further explained, 
as the present situation regarding these three countries is the 
following: 
 
i)  Syria is a founding member of the EMP and is negotiating a 
new Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement aiming at 
establishing an FTA; 
                                                 
71 See footnote 48, p. 5. 
72 ‘Building a Euro-Mediterranean Area’, Speech by Romano Prodi, President of 
the European Commission at the opening of the 22nd ‘Giornate 
Dell'Osservanza’, Bologna, 17 May 2003, Euromed report, issue 57, 22 May 
2003. 
54  
ii)  Iran is negotiating a trade and co-operation agreement 
outside the EMP
73, 
iii)  Iraq is under occupation but could eventually, in the future, 
join the EMP. Jordan, as a country without Mediterranean 
shores, could be considered as a previous example to justify 
the association of this other Arabic country to the Barcelona 
process. It could also be possible to associate, in a way or 
another, an independent Iraq to the Gulf Co-operation 
Council. At present the situation is however particularly 
unstable and nobody knows how the situation might evolve 
in the future. 
 
B)  The potential negative effects of the implementation of a 
Neighbourhood Policy on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
 
The issue at stake for the Mediterranean partners of the EU is how 
this new project could affect their privileged relationship with the 
EU as the dividing line between differentiation and discrimination 
is indeed not always obvious to draw. To take into account the 
perceptions of countries such as Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova 
and to try to co-operate with them and the Member States of an 
enlarged EU within a new comprehensive framework is indeed a 
challenge. 
 
1.  The risk of a ‘dilution’ of the EMP within the broader 
Neighbourhood Policy  
 
One of the main issues, from the point of view of the 
Mediterranean partners of the Union, is the risk of a dilution of a 
specific and privileged Euro-Mediterranean relationship within a 
broader framework including countries such as Russia. The 
Patten/Solana paper (see supra) even suggested that a new 
‘proximity policy initiative’ should initially focus on the ‘eastern 
neighbours’. On the other hand, according to Prodi's vision – and it 
                                                 
73 A mandate for such an agreement was presented by the Commission to the 
Council in November 2001 and was adopted in July 2002. The negotiations 
linked to negotiations on political dialogue and counter-terrorism, were launched 
in Brussels in December 2002. 
55  
remains to be seen whether this vision will be shared by the 
Member States at the IGC– highlighted in a speech given in 
Brussels in 2002: ‘to build the new Europe but neglect the ‘cradle 
of Europe’, the Mediterranean, would clearly be a grave 
mistake’
74. Therefore, the Barcelona process remains ‘completely 
valid because it is the only attempt ever made to address instability 
and diversity in the Mediterranean multilaterally and with a view 
to finding a long-term solution’. 
 
The considerable difference in socio-economic and political 
development and organisation between the eastern and southern 
neighbours of an enlarged Union anyway implies the risk of a 
marginalisation of some poorer and politically unstable countries 
due to the traditional hub and spokes effects between the centre and 
the periphery. According to the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe, the main challenge of the proposed 
Neighbourhood Policy ‘will be to promote sustained economic 
growth and reverse the trend towards rising absolute poverty and 
increased income disparities through further strengthening 
economic integration
75’.  
 
The danger is obvious: concentration of the EU's financial and 
economic aid towards the EU's eastern periphery at the expense of 
the southern periphery. The new initiatives implemented in favour 
of south-eastern Europe were already developed at the expense of 
the Mediterranean Partnership in terms of financial aid. 
 
2.  A new frontier? The Mediterranean as a ‘buffer zone’. 
 
The worst scenario would be to see the construction of a new 
frontier and, for the enlarged EU, to consider the Mediterranean as 
                                                 
74 R. Prodi: ‘Europe and the Mediterranean: Time for Action’, UCL - Université 
Catholique de Louvain-la-Neuve, 26 November 2002, DN: SPEECH/02/589. 
75 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Committee for trade, 
industry and enterprise development, Seventh session (13 and 16 May 2003), 
‘Trade, Business and Investment in a wider Europe’, Workshop held on 7 April 
2003, Note by the Secretariat, 1 May 2003, see Points 40, 41 and 42, available at 
http://www.unece.org/trade/tips/docs/ctied7/none_03_03.pdf  
56  
being a ‘buffer zone’ in-between the enlarged Union on the one 
hand and Africa and ‘Eurasia’ on the other hand.  
 
Soft and hard security concerns are still at the top of the Euro-
Mediterranean political agenda. William Wallace notes that: ‘the 
Commission Communication emphasises that the EU’s new 
neighbours are the source of less than 15% of new immigrants to 
the EU-15 (8.5% from the southern Mediterranean, and 5.5% from 
Russia and the ‘western CIS’ (…) a quarter of recent immigrants to 
the new member states of east-central Europe have come from their 
immediate neighbours further east. Necessarily, however, 
immigrants and asylum-seekers from the ‘further-abroad’ must 
cross these neighbouring states to reach the EU – with people-
smugglers probing each weak link in the EU’s defences, and 
switching routes from one neighbouring state to another as local 
conditions change’
76. The neighbourhood initiative is clearly, from 
the Union point of view, the perfect framework for tackling trans-
national and cross-border risks (drug and human trafficking, illegal 
migration flows, terrorism, money laundering, organised crime…). 
There is a danger that new human and political barriers might be 
erected. 
 
The aftermath of 11
th September is also taken into account. 
According to the European Commission ‘in the present geopolitical 
situation, developing better understanding with the Islamic 
countries which are closest to us is more important than ever’
77. 
The European diplomatic crisis that occurred before the last war 
against Iraq highlighted the future diplomatic challenges of the 
enlarged EU. Within the new strategic neighbourhood framework it 
is also expected that it could be easier to find compromises for 
defining common positions on the international scene. 
 
                                                 
76 W. Wallace, ‘Looking after the Neighbourhood: responsibilities for the EU-
25’, Groupement d'Etudes et de Recherche Notre Europe, Policy Papers N°4, 
July 2003 available at http://www.notre-europe.asso.fr/fichiers/Policypaper4.pdf 
77 Frequently asked questions on the 'Paving the way for a New Neighbourhood 
Instrument' Communication 01/07/03, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/we/intro/faq.htm  
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As stressed by Romano Prodi in another speech given in May 2003 
in Bologna: ‘whatever we do, we clearly cannot treat the 
Mediterranean as merely a security issue or peripheral region. That 
would be short-sighted because it would fail to recognise the 
human, social and historical processes under way in the Euro-
Mediterranean area, and ineffective because it would not get to 
grips with the root causes’
78. Nevertheless, the ‘everything but the 
institutions’ concept promoted by the President also means no 
participation in the decision-making process for the neighbours of 
the Union. The President of the Commission referred, in his last 
speeches, to the idea of ‘co-ownership’, which could be stepped up 
in the Euro-Mediterranean area notably through a new ‘Euro-
Mediterranean Bank’ and the ‘Foundation for dialogue between 
cultures’. This is obviously insufficient to avoid the frustrations of 
partners who will become more and more dependent upon the 
enlarged EU both in terms of financial aid and trade flows and 
therefore upon the decisions taken unilaterally in Brussels.  
 
To assume that an increase of financial flows and the extension of 
the four freedoms of the Internal Market will be sufficient to avoid 
any frustrations will be a serious mistake. There is therefore a 
strong need for a common consistent Pan-Euro-Mediterranean 
strategy
79 based on real Euro-Mediterranean common institutions 
capable of tackling the challenges ahead. More recently the 
President of the Commission envisaged, still in very vague terms, 
the possibility to ‘develop a type of political and institutional 
integration that goes far beyond the association agreements’. Such 
an institutionalisation seems to be an absolute necessity for the 
success of the envisaged strategy. A first small step in this direction 
occurred at the Valencia Euro-Mediterranean Conference in April 
2002 when an agreement was reached to set up a ‘Euro-
Mediterranean parliamentary assembly’.  
                                                 
78 ‘Building a Euro-Mediterranean Area’, Speech by Romano Prodi, President of 
the European Commission at the opening of the 22nd ‘Giornate 
Dell'Osservanza’, Bologna, 17 May 2003, Euromed report, issue 57, 22 May 
2003. 
79 See M. Maresceau and E. Lannon (eds), ‘The EU’s Enlargement and 
Mediterranean Strategies: a Comparative Analysis’, Palgrave, Basingstoke-New-
York, 2001, 403 p. 
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One of the main problems remains the transposition of the 
proposals of the Commission and its President by the Member 
States of an enlarged Union. There are in any case strong incentives 
as the, still theoretical, potential positive effects of the 
Neighbourhood Policy are indeed very attractive. 
 
C)  The potential positive effects expected from the 
neighbourhood policy for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
 
The traditional positive effects of regional integration are strongly 
promoted by the Commission and its President in their recent 
proposals, as it will not be easy to convince the Member States, but 
also the partners of the Union, of the need for such a very 
ambitious initiative. 
 
1.  A single framework for the EU's proximity relations  
 
Building a single framework for the EU's external proximity 
relations from Rabat to Moscow theoretically means reinforcing the 
effectiveness of EU policies and programmes. The reinforcement 
of the EMP within the new neighbourhood area will also benefit 
from new instruments such as the Euro-Mediterranean Bank and 
the Foundation for dialogue between cultures. The use of the Euro 
in order to foster closer economic and trade relations in the whole 
region will also be a useful tool. 
 
Among the main potential positive effects expected from the 
Neighbourhood Policy on the EMP one may identify: 
 
-  harmonising an important network of at least 12 bilateral 
agreements on the basis of new ‘special’ association 
agreements of proximity (see supra  for developments 
relating to this envisaged scenario);  
 
-  establishing a clear differentiation of the proximity and the 
‘non-proximity external relations’. This could clarify the 
real priorities of the enlarged Union but also raise important 
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institutional and inter-governmental debates about this new 
pyramid of privileges
80; 
 
-  stimulating a more consistent approach of the EU while 
defining and implementing inter-governmental policies. As 
mentioned before, this area of proximity is a ‘priority zone 
of action’ for the CFSP and the emerging ESDP (see the 
developments devoted to 1992 Lisbon Council supra); 
 
-  the approximation of trade legislation offers considerable 
potential for the development of trade flows and FDI
70; 
 
-  the implementation of concerted actions financed on the 
MEDA, PHARE, TACIS, or CARDS programmes (see 
supra); 
 
-  the progressive adoption of common political standards; 
 
-  the reinforcement of the effectiveness of strategies 
implemented to address transnational and cross-border 
issues (drugs and human trafficking, illegal migration flows, 
terrorism, money laundering, organised crime…).  
 
Generally speaking, for the Mediterranean candidate countries 
(Cyprus, Malta and Turkey), the project is also clearly an 
opportunity to maintain a privileged relationship with their direct 
neighbours notably by implementing cross-border strategies.  
 
2.  Towards a great Euro-Mediterranean Market: the 
benefit from economies of scale 
 
The envisaged great Euro-Mediterranean Market will be indeed 
attractive for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows. Precisely, one 
of the most important failures of the EMP is that this initiative and 
the conclusion of the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements 
(with the exception of Syria) did not, until today, attract FDI given 
                                                 
80 The European Parliament already warned that such a proximity policy could 
not be implemented at the detriment of ACP Asian or Latin American countries. 
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the present geo-political situation and consequent geo-economic 
uncertainties. According to the European Commission, the 
importance of the EU neighbours is ‘considerable, in view of the 
fact that compared to the enlarged EU, which will have over 450 
million inhabitants; these countries combined have a population of 
385 million. Most of them, however, have a nominal gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita of less than EUR 2,000, which 
is below 10% of the EU average. The total share of world foreign 
direct investment (FDI), which goes to the new neighbours, is just 
1.65% as opposed to the 21.3% that goes to the EU, and acceding 
and candidate countries.’
81  
 
According to the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe ‘the non-acceding countries will benefit from simplified 
and enhanced access to the enlarged EU Single Market through and 
from the extension of common regimes and regulatory frameworks. 
The enlargement, in itself, could contribute to lower transaction 
costs, which should be achieved through greater transparency and 
simplified procedures and, especially, harmonization, and 
approximation of competitive conditions in the form of trade 
regulations (…). Rising income in the newly acceding countries 
might also create new comparative advantages as well as export 
opportunities for non-acceding countries’.
82 Improved access for 
the neighbours of the enlarged EU to the Internal Market and a 
substantial increase in FDI flows are certainly key aspects of the 
                                                 
81 According to the presentation made by the European Commission at the 
workshop held on 7 April 2003 within the framework of the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe, Committee for trade, industry and enterprise 
development, Seventh session (13 and 16 May 2003), ‘Trade, Business and 
Investment in a wider Europe’, Note by the Secretariat, 1 May 2003, see point 
15, available at http://www.unece.org/trade/tips/docs/ctied7/none_03_03.pdf, see 
also the tables included in the Commission services working document to 
prepare the Euro-Mediterranean Mid-Term Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Crete,  
26-27 May, 2003, available at 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/conf/cret/predoc.pdf   
82 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Committee for trade, 
industry and enterprise development, Seventh session (13 and 16 May 2003), 
‘Trade, Business and Investment in a wider Europe’, Workshop held on 7 April 
2003, Note by the Secretariat, 1 May 2003, see Points 40, 41 and 42, available at 
http://www.unece.org/trade/tips/docs/ctied7/none_03_03.pdf  
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scenario. Economically speaking, the European incentives (the 
carrot) are clearly based on financial aid and co-operation, 
improved access to EU programmes and on the potential increase 
of trade.  
 
Originally the EMP was designed to establish (or reinforce) three 
new types of FTA's alongside the three old Euro-Mediterranean 
CU's: 
i)  FTA's between 9 Mediterranean partners and the EC and its 
Member States
83; 
ii)  FTA's between the Mediterranean partners themselves; 
iii)  FTA's between the Mediterranean partners and the CEEC's. 
 
In other words, this network of bilateral agreements will facilitate 
the insertion of most of the MNMC's in a coherent legal framework 
with the enlarged Union. On the other hand, the Barcelona 
Declaration and process did not originally take into account the 
possibility of establishing special trade relationships between the 
12 MNMC's and the NIS.  
 
The development of contractual relations between Russia, Ukraine, 
Moldova and Belarus on the one hand, and the MNMC's on the 
other hand, must become a priority of the EU's Neighbourhood 
Policy in order to render possible the creation of a vast integrated 
market. It remains to be seen whether these neighbours will be 
enthusiastic enough about the EU's project to do so. For their part, 
Moroccan authorities apparently decided to continue to promote the 
idea of an ‘advanced statute of Morocco within the EMP’. ‘More 
than association and less than accession’ are the keywords of the 
strategy
84. This is clearly a reaction to the present enlargement. One 
                                                 
83 The PLO benefits from an agreement providing for an FTA but it is not a 
mixed agreement
 . 
84 See Moroccan Press Agency (MAP): ‘Maroc-France: Mise en oeuvre d'un 
programme de travail autour des priorités du gouvernement marocain’, Rabat, 25 
July 2003, available at:  
http://www.map.co.ma/mapfr/info_fr/gouv_raffarin_maroc.htm,  
See also ‘European Union and Morocco strengthen their relations’, IP/03/274 - 
Brussels, 24
th February 2003, available at: 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/morocco/intro/ip03_274.htm  
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can also now try to evaluate the first Mediterranean reactions to the 
neighbourhood initiative as such. 
 
D)  The first Mediterranean reactions to the neighbourhood 
initiative 
 
According to the Presidency conclusions of the Euro-
Mediterranean Mid-Term Meeting of Foreign Ministers, held in 
May 2003, the partners already had the opportunity to discuss the 
‘role of the Mediterranean partners’ on the basis of the 
Commission Communication on Wider Europe – Neighbourhood
85. 
Thus, a specific section devoted to ‘Wider Europe’ was inserted 
within the conclusions.  
 
The two paragraphs devoted to the issue are, without great surprise, 
formulated in very general terms. It seems obvious that the 
participants adopted a ‘wait and see’ approach given the absence of 
consensus on a brand new proposal that could transform the whole 
Barcelona process. During the conference, the Ministers discussed 
the proposals of the Commission Communication on Wider Europe 
and ‘agreed that the proposed new Neighbourhood Policy sets out 
a means to reinforce the Barcelona Process, and to develop closer 
co-operation based on the mutual recognition of common 
interests’. The Ministers then invited the Commission to explore 
how, within the existing MEDA Programme, a ‘more substantial 
involvement of the Mediterranean partners in the relevant EU 
programmes could be achieved’.  They also noted that the 
Commission’s proposals on a Wider Europe-new Neighbourhood 
Policy ‘encourage regulatory reform, especially in the services 
sector, that can give a strong boost to economic growth and 
competitiveness’. The economic impact of EU enlargement on the 
partners should also be considered in terms of ‘focusing attention 
on further economic policy reforms that constitute the driving force 
behind economic growth performance’. 
 
                                                 
85 Presidency Conclusions of the Euro-Mediterranean Mid-Term Meeting of 
Foreign Ministers, Crete, 26-27 May, 2003, available at 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/conf/cret/concl.htm  
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For the Arab partners of the EU the perceptions of the project may 
vary from one country to another. But, whereas the potential 
positive effects are undoubtedly attractive, the fear of being 
considered as a ‘negligible geopolitical entity’ as compared to 
countries such as Russia is also obvious. 
 
Morocco is nowadays playing a leading role in the EMP and also at 
regional level. This country recently requested from the Union a 
new ‘enhanced status’
86 and is now apparently promoting the idea 
of a strong differentiation strategy among neighbouring countries. 
At another level, Morocco is also one of the initiators of the 
‘Agadir Initiative’
87 to be considered as one of the first Arabic 
answers to the next EU enlargement. Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia and 
Egypt have decided in May 2001 to create a south-south Free Trade 
Area on the basis of the Euro-Mediterranean Association 
Agreements and to develop inter-Arab cooperation in order to: 
 
i)  counterbalance the enlargement of the EU and avoid an 
economic marginalisation of the Arab MNMC's; 
ii)  to avoid the intra-maghrebi problems (the Arab Maghreb 
Union cannot work properly because of the tensions 
between Algeria and Morocco); 
iii)  to render the Arab markets more attractive for foreign 
investors. 
 
Last January, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia concluded in 
Amman the negotiations for this regional Free Trade Agreement. 
This constitutes a major step forward in their economic integration 
and for the completion of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area. 
This initiative is also a clear reaction to EU enlargement. 
                                                 
86 According to the Moroccan Press Agency: ‘Concernant le statut avancé souhaité par 
le Maroc avec l'Union Européenne, la France affirme sa volonté de contribuer 
activement à faire aboutir ce projet qui s'inscrit dans la perspective de la nouvelle 
politique de voisinage de l'Europe’. ‘Maroc-France: Mise en œuvre d'un programme 
de travail autour des priorités du gouvernement marocain’, Moroccan Press Agency, 
available at http://www.map.co.ma/mapfr/info_fr/gouv_raffarin_maroc.htm.  
87 The Agadir Initiative was launched in may 2001 when the foreign Ministers of 
Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia and Egypt adopted the so called ‘Agadir Declaration’ 
in Rabat. 
64  
According to Abderrahman Youssoufi, former Moroccan Prime 
Minister, ‘l’élargissement, tel qu’il se dessine, et malgré l’adhésion 
prévue de Malte et de Chypre, accentue manifestement le tropisme 
centre et nord-européen de l’Union, à un moment où la 
Méditerranée n’a pas, n’a quasiment plus de «champion». Dans 
une Europe à 25, la France, l’Espagne et l’Italie risquent d’avoir 
de plus en plus de difficultés à faire entendre la voix de la mer 
intérieure, la voix de la Méditerranée’
88. This point of view implies 
that within the framework of the neighbourhood initiative, priority 
will be given to the EU's eastern periphery. Therefore many 
Mediterranean Arab countries will try to promote projects such as 
the Agadir initiative or the Great Arab Free Trade Zone. On the 
other hand, Morocco may perceive this new Policy as being an 
opportunity to develop new strategies outside the EMP and the 
traditional Pan-Arab relations. 
 
Israel, given its economic and political isolation in the region but 
also because of its high level of (technological) development could 
be much more attracted by this new concept of ‘special 
neighbourhood relations’ with the enlarged EU. 
 
According to  Stephen C. Calleya ‘the Barcelona framework is 
flexible enough to tackle the challenges of a wider Europe’
89. On 
the other hand, for Fraser Cameron, ‘recent history, however, 
demonstrates that the ‘waiting room’ formula has had a distinct 
lack of success. For most countries, there is only one game in town 
- the EU - and that implies full membership. The OSCE, Council of 
Europe, even EFTA/EEA, are important bodies - as is NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace - but not the real thing. Outside the EU there 
is little enthusiasm for the formula of membership of ‘everything 
                                                 
88 A. Youssoufi ‘Maroc : Interrogations et inquiétudes’, Confluences Méditerranée, n° 
46, Eté 2003, Paris, available at: 
http://confluences.ifrance.com/confluences/Textes/46youssoufi.htm  
89 S. C. Calleya, ‘EU Enlargement and the Future Europe: the Southern 
Dimension’, Wilton Park Conference, WP701, Tuesday 11th - Friday 14th 
February 2003, available at: 
http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/web/conferences/reportwrapper.asp?ConfRef=WP
701  
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but the institutions’
90. It is still a long way from developing an 
effective Neighbourhood Policy. The Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership will therefore remain a keystone for the EU's southern 
periphery. The EMP must, however, be reinforced and adapted to 
the forthcoming tremendous changes.  
 
V.  The perceptions of the future eastern neighbours and 
other European countries regarding the envisaged policy 
 
A.  The former Soviet-Union: the ‘Grey zone’ of 
enlargement 
 
After the accession of eight CEECs, Russia will, more than ever, 
become a key strategic partner of the EU. On the brink of 
enlargement, proximity issues can no longer be avoided or 
ignored.
91 Consequently, Russia’s reactions to the EU’s emerging 
Neighbourhood Policy are highly relevant.   
 
1.  Russia: the promotion of the bilateral EU-Russia 
Partnership 
 
According to Vladimir Shemiatenkov, former Ambassador of the 
Soviet Union to the European Communities, ‘the introduction of 
the concept of the ‘Wider Europe’ into the vocabulary of the 
European Union signals a welcome change in the EU’s political 
philosophy.’
92 The position of the EU has always been that 
enlargement is an internal matter between the Member States and 
the candidate countries and that Russia has no power or right to 
interfere in that process.
93 As a result, Russian attempts to start 
                                                 
90 F. Cameron, ‘The Wider Europe’, The European Policy Centre, June 2003, 
available at http://www.ji-magazine.lviv.ua/engl-vers/border/texts2003/euractiv-
12-06.htm  
91 The discussions surrounding the future of Kaliningrad provide a perfect 
example of the existing challenges. 
92 V. Shemiatenkov, The ‘Wider Europe’: Can the idea be ‘sold’ in the East? 
Available at: 
http://www.theepc.net/Services/search_result.asp?kword=Eastern%20Europe    
93 X, Russia seeks ‘clarification’ on EU eastward enlargement and Kaliningrad. 
Uniting Europe, 2000, 111, p.1. 
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consultations on the possible negative impact of the Union’s 
eastward expansion have always been dispelled by the axiomatic 
statement that both Russia and the EU will benefit from 
enlargement.  
 
An analysis of Russia’s position reveals a focus on economic 
issues. In a list of specific Russian concerns on eastwards 
expansion of the European Union,
94 submitted to Romano Prodi at 
the end of August 1999, 13 out of the 15 points were related to 
economic or trade issues. There is an obvious fear that Russian 
exporters will face enormous problems after the CEECs introduced 
the EU standards and regulations. It is expected that the new 
Member States will divert a major part of their trade from the 
Russian market to the Single Market. Moscow also fears a 
redirection of investment flows and a reduced usage of its own 
foreign trade infrastructure. Other concerns relate to the extension 
of the Common Agricultural Policy, the impact of the candidate’s 
inclusion in the EU’s Generalised System of Preferences and, last 
but not least, the freedom of transit and movement of persons after 
the introduction of restrictive Schengen rules. The latter issue is of 
particular importance for the future status of the Russian 
Kaliningrad oblast. Bearing in mind its unique geographical 
position, it can be argued that Kaliningrad will feel the effects of 
enlargement more than any other proximity country or region. A 
failure to tackle the undeniable economic and social problems 
could therefore turn the region into a permanent source of 
instability. Against this background, the future development of 
Kaliningrad can be seen as a test case for the success of the EU’s 
emerging Neighbourhood Policy.  
 
The dilemmas Kaliningrad poses to Brussels are a reflection of the 
general problems connected with the enlargement process as such. 
Efficient border management, the fight against illegal immigration, 
trafficking, organised crime or terrorist networks all have to be 
tackled in the framework of geographical proximity. A well-
defined proximity policy must coincide with a strategy to ‘tackle 
                                                 
94 X, Russia seeks new Commission’s understanding on enlargement request, 
Uniting Europe, 1999, 66, pp.3-4. 
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the root causes of political instability, economic vulnerability, 
institutional deficiencies, conflict and poverty and social 
exclusion.’ These broad challenges have all been defined in the 
European Commission’s framework Communication
95 and can be 
applied to Russia, with a special remark to Kaliningrad, but also to 
the countries of the southern Mediterranean (see supra). This 
observation supports the idea to include Russia in the framework of 
a general policy towards all neighbouring countries. On the other 
hand, there is a fundamental difference between Russia and the 
other countries. Russia already has a land border with the EU and 
cooperation on ‘proximity issues’ already exists under the Northern 
Dimension framework. Furthermore, the already existing EU-
Russia Partnership relations and Russia’s self perception as a 
global player explains why the all-inclusive ‘Wider Europe’ 
concept ‘is unlikely to stir much emotion in the East’.
96 The idea 
reflects somewhere the old Gorbachev rhetoric of a ‘common 
European home’ and, at least in the present situation, lacks some 
tangible content. Russia, therefore, would appear to concentrate on 
the development of the bilateral EU-Russia Partnership. In this 
respect the idea of a Common European Economic Space (or area) 
is of primary importance. This concept, which was mentioned for 
the first time in the EU’s Common Strategy on Russia, implies a 
progressive approximation of legislation and standards. At the EU-
Russia summit of October 2001, both parties agreed to establish a 
joint High-Level Group to elaborate this idea.
97 The High-Level 
Group will meet twice a year to consider the opportunities offered 
by greater economic integration and legislative approximation. The 
outcome of these discussions will be brought to the attention of 
relevant PCA bodies and EU-Russia summits. The final measures 
are expected to extend co-operation and to eliminate existing 
obstacles to trade, investment and transit. Moreover, they should 
accelerate Russia's process of accession to the WTO.
98 This picture 
                                                 
95 See footnote 48, p. 6. 
96 See footnote 92.   
97 Joint Statement, EU-Russia summit, Brussels, 3 October 2001. Available at: 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/   
98 Proposal for a Council Decision on the Community position to be adopted in 
the Co-operation Council established by the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the 
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is completely in line with Russia’s focus on economics in its 
relationship with the EU. Russia’s ‘Medium-term Strategy for the 
development of relations with the EU’
99 defined the development 
of ‘an advanced pan-European economic and legal infrastructure’ 
as one of the priorities for the forthcoming decade. 
 
It can be argued that Russia’s primary interest in the elaboration of 
this concept can give impetus to the EU’s general proximity policy. 
Romano Prodi already referred to the Common European 
Economic Space as a model for the further development of 
relations with all neighbouring countries.
100 In this regard, the 
‘Wider Europe’ could be envisaged as a ‘conglomerate of common 
spaces.’
101 On the other hand it has to be mentioned that Russia 
also looks at the establishment of a single economic area with 
Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. According to Viktor Khristenko, 
Russia’s deputy Prime Minister, these countries are ‘ready to sign 
their Rome agreement that led to the creation of the European 
Union.’
102 Whereas this plan remains very vague, it stresses the 
importance of good proximity relations in order to avoid new 
dividing lines in Europe. Moreover, it reveals the specific position 
of the so-called western NIS, which are becoming EU neighbours 
on the one hand but continue to maintain privileged relations with 
Russia on the other.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                              
one part, and the Russian Federation, of the other part, in relation to the 
establishment of a joint High-Level Group to elaborate the concept of a common 
European economic space. COM (2001) 673 final, 19 November 2001, p.6. 
99 This Medium-Term  Strategy is Russia’s official response to the EU’s 
Common Strategy of June 1999 and is available at  : 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/russian_medium_term_strate
gy/   
100 See footnote 45. 
101 See footnote 92. 
102 X, Continent may get another European Union. (28.08.2003), available at: 
http://www.euobserver.com   
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2.  The ‘western NIS’: Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova 
 
a.  Ukraine: nothing but accession? 
 
The perceived necessity to offer the eastern neighbours a 
stimulating perspective is particularly targeted on Ukraine, which 
has always underlined its European aspirations and its long-term 
objective of joining the European Union. The explicit exclusion of 
the candidate countries and in particular the western Balkan 
countries, which only have ‘potential membership status’ and a 
long-term accession perspective (see infra), contributed to the 
perception that the proposed EU Neighbourhood Policy may serve 
as an alternative to further enlargement. Despite the deepening 
relationship between Kiev and Brussels, the Ukrainian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs soon made clear that the Commission proposal did 
not fully meet Ukrainian expectations. Only after explicit 
statements that involvement in the new Neighbourhood Policy does 
not necessarily exclude any long-term accession perspective, 
reactions became more positive. In the framework of the 
Partnership and Cooperation assessment report
103 Ukraine has 
emphasised a commitment ‘to align its legislation, norms and 
standards as far as possible to the EU model’. Simultaneously, the 
EU is expected to ‘consider an inclusive policy of involvement of 
Ukraine to European integration.’ In this regard, Ukraine is 
demanding associated EU membership, including the establishment 
of a free trade zone, instead of the existing partnership. To reach 
this ambitious aim, Kiev supports the European Commission’s 
intention to draw up an action plan within the framework of the 
New Neighbourhood Policy.
104 Furthermore, the Ukrainian 
government confirmed that its long-term objective remains full 
accession to the enlarged EU. During the October 2003 EU-
Ukraine Summit in Yalta, the EU delegation made clear that it was 
not ready to make any commitment which would go beyond the 
                                                 
103 Joint report on the implementation of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement  
between the EU and Ukraine, available at: 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ukraine/intro/pcarep2.pdf  
104 X, Ukraine wants association and free trade zone with EU, Uniting Europe, 
2003, 144, p.2. 
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Wider Europe-New Neighbourhood initiative. On the other hand, 
the final statement of this summit explicitly mentioned that this 
initiative ‘should be seen as separate from the question of possible 
EU accession.’
105
 
Ukraine’s interest in closer relations with the EU provides an 
opportunity to apply the outlined neighbourhood methodology. 
This essentially implies that preferential relations will be offered 
according to the progress made by the partner country in political 
and economic reform. The European Commission clearly hopes 
that a successful implementation of this strategy in the Union’s 
relations with Ukraine could serve as a stimulating example for 
other neighbouring countries. This potential process of ‘spill-over’ 
is considered to be the main advantage of bringing divergent 
countries together within one single framework. A basic 
prerequisite, however, is that the partner countries show an interest 
in legal approximation and closer relations. Given its geopolitical 
position and its fear of becoming a buffer zone between Russia and 
an enlarged EU, Ukraine can be considered as the neighbouring 
state which is the most receptive to the Union’s proposals in this 
regard. The situation of Belarus and Moldova is somewhat 
different.  
 
b.  Belarus: a position of self-imposed isolation 
 
Under the autocratic presidency of Alexander Lukashenko, Belarus 
evolved into a position of self-imposed isolation. As a result, the 
Union does not have any formal links with this regime. A 
Partnership and Co-operation Agreement had been signed in 1995 
but its implementation has been suspended in the wake of 
constitutional amendments that virtually abolished the basic 
features of a democratic State system. Ever since, Lukashenko has 
demonstrated an unwavering reluctance to change his policy in the 
face of EU critics, sanctions or the promise of normalised 
                                                 
105 The final statement of the Yalta summit is available at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ukraine   
71  
relations.
106 In this context, the EU is facing a very difficult 
situation. If it accepted the Lukashenko regime as a partner in 
international relations, this would seriously impair the EU’s 
democratic credibility. On the other hand, it is obvious that the EU 
itself has an important self-interest in developing a working 
relationship with Belarus as this country is on the verge of 
becoming a future neighbour of the enlarged EU. Combating soft 
security issues in Europe, such as organised crime, pollution and 
illegal immigration implies the commitment of all European states, 
even those that are not on the road to EU accession. This is exactly 
the main motivation behind the whole concept of strengthened 
proximity relations. Notwithstanding the limited successes in the 
past, it is clear that the EU cannot stay on the sidelines but must 
engage actively in monitoring the Belarusian situation.  
 
Lukashenko, however, never showed any commitment towards EU 
critics. He preferred to keep his country out of ongoing 
developments in western Europe and reoriented Belarusian foreign 
policy almost exclusively towards Russia.
107 Yet, it has to be 
mentioned that this option also has certain limits. Particularly 
Putin’s proposal to include Belarus as Russia’s sixth district 
(oblast) disappointed Lukashenko. Consequently, it is in the EU’s 
self-interest to provide an attractive alternative model of 
cooperation. A similar remark can be made in connection to 
Moldova. 
 
c.  Moldova: the problem of internal instability 
 
Moldova, Europe’s poorest country
108, faces enormous economic 
and social difficulties aggravated as a result of ethnic conflicts. 
                                                 
106 For an overview, see: P. Van Elsuwege, EU-Belarus: the Development of a 
Difficult Relationship, Belarusian Review, 14, 2002, 1, pp.3-10. 
107 The two countries have signed a number of treaties, which launched a process 
of bilateral integration that seems to be based on the model provided by the 
European Union. See: C., Rontoyanni, A Russo-Belarusian ‘Union state’: a 
defensive response to Western enlargement?’ University of Glasgow, 
Department of Politics, Working Paper 10/00. 
108 Rank 108 at the  United Nations Human Development Index, 
http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator     
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Negative consequences such as corruption, illicit trade, traffic in 
arms, drugs and human beings, tend to constitute a real danger for 
the entire region.
109 As a result, active EU involvement is very 
desirable, particularly since Moldova’s political elite revealed an 
interest in closer links with the EU. Even though Moldova will not 
immediately become a neighbour of the enlarged EU, the fifth 
meeting of the EU-Moldova Cooperation Council (18 March 2003) 
concluded that ‘the ‘Wider Europe’ debate could lead to tangible 
results and potential for a new level of co-operation, in order to 
draw Moldova closer to the EU.’
110 The EU reminded the 
Moldavian government of the need to fulfil Council of Europe 
recommendations concerning democratic standards, rights of the 
parliamentary opposition, freedom of the media and freedom of 
religion.  Moreover, the EU stressed the importance of a rapid and 
sustainable solution to the Transnistrian conflict, which has been 
described as ‘the key to the country’s future political and economic 
development’.
111 Taking into account Russia’s involvement in this 
area
112, it is obvious that Russia could play a key role in the 
solution of this problem. Notwithstanding the fact that Russia is 
already a neighbour and a strategic partner of the EU, it is indeed 
difficult to envisage strengthened regional co-operation without 
this country. It can even be argued that a further development of 
the EU-Russian partnership is a prerequisite for democratic 
                                                 
109 A., Skvortova, Moldova and the EU: Direct Neighbourhood and Security 
Issues. In: I., Kempe, (ed), Beyond EU Enlargement. The Agenda of Direct 
Neighbourhood for Eastern Europe (Vol. 1), Gütersloh, Bertelsmann, 2001, 
pp.104-125. 
110 Fifth meeting of the Co-operation Council between the European Union and 
the Republic of Moldova, Brussels, 18 March 2003, 7432/03.  
111 A similar assessment has been made in the Union’s Strategy Paper on Moldova See: 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/moldova/csp/02_06_en.pdf    
112 As a historical part of the Russian empire, Transnistrian hardliners opposed 
(and continue to oppose) the nationalistic and pro-Romanian policy line of post-
Soviet Moldova. With the support of Russia’s 14
th army, they have managed to 
create a de facto independent state, known today as the Dniester Republic. 
Recently the Council decided to impose a travel ban on the Transnistrian leaders 
who continuously obstruct the search for a political settlement of the conflict. 
Virtually all of them possess a Russian or former Soviet Union passport. 
 (Council Common Position 2003/139/CFSP of 27 February 2003 concerning 
restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the 
Moldovan Republic, OJ L 53/60, 28 Feb. 2003.)  
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improvements in neighbouring countries such as Belarus and 
Moldova.  
 
3.  The southern Caucasus: fears of isolation 
 
The position of Russia is also of particular importance in the 
countries of the southern Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan), which face a risk of isolation from EU affairs. 
Notwithstanding the obvious geostrategic importance of this region 
with massive oil reserves, bordering Turkey in the South and 
Russia in the North, the European Commission explicitly excluded 
this area from its new Neighbourhood Policy. According to the 
Commission, only those countries that will border the enlarged 
Union in 2004 and do not currently have a perspective of 
membership are included. ‘Given their location, the southern 
Caucasus therefore fall outside the geographic scope of the 
initiative for the time being.’
113 Only after the future accession of 
Turkey, this geographical scope may be revised. It has to be 
mentioned, however, that also Moldova does not fit within the 
European Commission’s definition. This country, located between 
Romania and Ukraine, will not share a border with the enlarged EU 
in 2004. From a geographical point of view, it is therefore hard to 
explain why for instance Georgia, having a sea border with the EU 
candidates Romania and Bulgaria and a large land border with 
Turkey, is not included.  
 
On several occasions, Georgia had already shown an interest in 
closer relations with the EU and full integration into the European 
structures. The non-inclusion in the Commission’s proposals on a 
new Neighbourhood Policy therefore led to the publication of a 
Georgian non-paper on the Wider Europe framework 
Communication
114, presented to the fifth meeting of the EU-
Georgia Joint Parliamentary Committee held in Brussels on 16 and 
17 June 2003. This document underlines Georgia’s foreign policy 
priority of further approximation to the EU and stresses the 
                                                 
113 See footnote 48, p. 4.  
114 Available at: 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/meetdocs/delegations/caus/20030521/04.pdf  
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arguments in favour of an active EU engagement in the southern 
Caucasus. First, this region geographically belongs to Europe. 
Second, due to the EU-Turkey Customs Union, these countries 
share an economic border with the EU. Inclusion of the southern 
Caucasus would therefore completely be in line with the objective 
of ‘avoiding new dividing lines in Europe’. Moreover, ‘the South 
Caucasus should be included into the new Initiative, because this 
Initiative particularly underlines the necessity of resolving existing 
conflicts. As for stability and security of the European continent, 
the South Caucasus region has considerable importance.’
115  
 
It can indeed be argued that this area shares the opportunities and 
challenges surrounding proximity, prosperity and poverty 
mentioned in the Commission’s Communication.
116 For instance, 
the EU’s Strategy Paper on Georgia has identified poverty 
reduction and the fight against terrorism as main priorities for 
future action.
117 Both aspects are explicit objectives of the new 
Neighbourhood Policy and of particular importance in the 
framework of the EU Security Strategy. In a draft paper on the 
development of this strategy, presented to the June 2003 
Thessaloniki European Council, CFSP High Representative Javier 
Solana therefore recommended that ‘we should take a stronger 
interest in the problems of the southern Caucasus, which will in 
due course also be a neighbouring region’.
118 The European 
Parliament even explicitly advocates the inclusion of Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia into the new Neighbourhood Policy.
119 In 
this regard, it is noteworthy that the Council of Ministers’ 
conclusions on the Wider Europe Initiative only vaguely 
maintained that ‘at a later stage, the Council will examine whether 
the southern Caucasus countries could also be covered within these 
                                                 
115 ibid.  
116 See footnote 48, pp.6-7. 
117 Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006, available at: 
 http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/georgia/csp/02_06_en.pdf  
118 ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World, Draft European Security Strategy 
presented by the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, Javier Solana, to the European Council, 20 June 2003 in Thessaloniki, 
Greece. Available at: http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/EN/reports/76255.pdf  
119 See footnote 56, p.12. 
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policies.’
120 It is, in other words, obvious that the problems of this 
region are not yet a priority for the Member States. The perceived 
reluctance of the EU to engage more actively can be linked with 
Russia’s traditional geopolitical interests and long-standing 
presence in this area. Furthermore, another regional power, Turkey, 
plays an important role towards the Islamic former Soviet republics 
and tries to apply a pro-active policy towards countries with 
important Turkish- speaking minorities. In this context, the EU 
seems to refrain from a more active involvement in this region. 
Situated at the crossroads between Europe’s Mediterranean and 
Eastern flanks, the southern Caucasus thus faces the risk of falling 
somewhere in between. At least, there is a perception that this 
region might become the ‘black hole’ in the EU’s comprehensive 
policy towards its immediate environment. 
 
B)  The views of the acceding CEEC’s 
 
Enlargement pushes the borders of the Union further to the East 
and to the South. Accordingly, the acceding countries are primarily 
responsible for EU border management. It is, therefore, obvious 
that these countries have a main interest in the development of 
good proximity relations with the new neighbours and can be 
expected to bring this issue onto the EU’s agenda. 
 
1.  The Polish proposals: the influence of the Finnish 
example 
 
On several occasions Poland revealed a commitment to enforce EU 
engagement towards its direct neighbourhood in the same way as 
Finland promoted the Northern Dimension.
121 Former Polish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Bronislaw Geremek already referred to 
                                                 
120 Council Conclusions on Wider Europe - New Neighbourhood, Brussels, 12 
June 2003, 10447/03. 
121 The accession of Finland provides a striking example of new EU Member 
States’ agenda-setting powers. From the moment they entered the EU 
institutions, Finnish politicians called for a better balance between the Union’s 
commitments to and resources reserved for Europe’s southern and northern rim. 
Finland launched the specific Northern Dimension initiative, thereby shifting the 
focus to its direct neighbourhood.  
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the necessity to enhance the EU’s policy towards its Eastern 
neighbours in his statement on the opening of the accession 
negotiations (31 March 1998).
122 In the summer of 2001 the Polish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a more extensive document 
on the future Eastern policy of the enlarged EU.
123 In Poland’s 
view, there is an objective necessity for a more active EU 
involvement in the post-Soviet area, particularly in those states that 
will border the Union after enlargement. Poland, therefore, calls for 
a more coherent EU Eastern policy. This would imply the 
establishment of ‘uniform criteria and identical standards to all 
states established in the post-Soviet space’.  
 
The ultimate objective of this strategy is to develop good-
neighbourly relations on the basis of further co-operation and 
integration into a common European economic and social area. 
This document did not offer an elaborated view on the contents of 
the ‘criteria’ and ‘standards’ to be applied and the means to achieve 
the strategic objectives. It only vaguely refers to ‘new economic 
relationships’ and ‘direct neighbourhood strategies’. On the other 
hand, however, the Polish initiative provided an interesting mindset 
for the gradual development of the EU’s activities in the CIS 
region. At the least, it contributed to a growing awareness that the 
EU should focus more on the consequences of enlargement for 
those countries that do not have an accession perspective.  
 
2.  The Visegrád Countries’ perspective: a focus on the 
‘Eastern Dimension’ 
 
The Polish views have later been incorporated in a regional 
perspective. The document ‘The Eastern Policy of the European 
Union - The Visegrád Countries’
124 Perspective’
125 clearly refined 
                                                 
122 Statement of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland Bronislaw 
Geremek on Opening of Poland’s Negotiations on Membership in the European 
Union. http://www.zbiordokumentow.pl/1998/1/2.html   
123 Polish Ministry Of Foreign Affairs, The Eastern policy of the European 
Union in the run-up to the EU’s enlargement to include the Countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe - a Polish view’, Warsaw, 2001, 31 p. 
124 Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. 
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the initial Polish proposals. Whereas the original Polish paper 
regularly referred to the ‘post-Soviet space’ or the ‘CIS area’, the 
Visegrád document explicitly stated that the Eastern policy of the 
EU should only focus on Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, with a 
possible extension to Moldova after the EU accession of Romania. 
Furthermore, the Visegrád countries proposed a two-track policy 
towards these new neighbours. A region-oriented strategy, called 
the Eastern Dimension, would be complemented by national 
strategies in order to create a ‘flexible policy, tailor-made to the 
possibilities and expectations of the individual eastern neighbours.’ 
A general carrot and stick approach, already present in the earlier 
Polish document, turned out to be the main characteristic of the 
Visegrád proposal. According to this method, the EU requires a list 
of potential advantages in order to stimulate the implementation of 
its own political, economic and legal standards in the neighbouring 
countries. The Visegrád group pleads for ‘specific and attractive’ 
goals, which could take the form of ‘aid funds, facilitation of 
access to the EU market, preferential credits, etc.’. In the longer 
run, the EU is expected to apply the ‘open door’ principle: an 
eventual accession perspective may not be excluded. Furthermore, 
the Visegrád countries proposed the introduction of an ‘adaptation 
programme’.
126  
 
These proposals clearly contributed to the March 2003 Commission 
communication ‘Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New 
Framework for Relations with our Eastern and southern 
Neighbours’. The most striking difference of course is the 
observation that the Visegrád countries promote a specific policy 
towards the Union’s Eastern neighbours, whereas the Commission 
proposal includes Russia, the western NIS and the southern 
Mediterranean countries into one comprehensive framework. In 
                                                                                                              
125 The Eastern Policy of the European Union - The Visegrád Countries’ 
Perspective. Available at: http://www.msz.gov.pl/start.php   
126 This would imply the negotiation of a separate co-operation agenda and 
schedule with each participating country, together with a regular assessment of 
progress within the existing bilateral institutions. This system is supposed to 
create added value since it would introduce a complete ‘conditionality’ of the 
aid, which would be precisely determined in advance and linked to specific 
reform requirements. 
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addition, it has to be mentioned that the Commission 
Communication confirmed a new differentiation between countries 
that have a (potential) membership perspective and countries 
without such a prospect.  
 
C)  Countries in the ‘waiting room’ 
 
1.  Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey: the near (2007) and 
unknown future 
 
The EU’s new Neighbourhood Policy does not affect the remaining 
candidate countries for EU Membership. Bulgaria and Romania 
already maintain a privileged relationship with the EU and are on 
top of its hierarchical policy, as much in a political as in a legal 
sense. The Presidency Conclusions of the December 2002 
Copenhagen European Council confirmed that these countries are 
part of the ‘same inclusive and irreversible enlargement process’ 
and refer to 2007 as the target date of EU accession.
127 The June 
2003 Thessaloniki European Council confirmed this objective and 
expressly ruled out any alternatives to accession: ‘Discussions on 
future policy reforms, or the new financial perspective, shall 
neither impede the pursuit and conclusion of accession 
negotiations nor be prejudged by the outcome of these 
negotiations.’
128   
 
The position of Turkey is somewhat different, taking into account 
that accession negotiations have not yet started.
129 On the other 
hand, Turkey is a candidate state ‘destined to join the Union on the 
basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate 
                                                 
127 Presidency Conclusions Copenhagen European Council (12-13 December 
2002), Bull. EU, I.5.13. 
128 Presidency Conclusions Thessaloniki European Council (19-20 June 2003).  
129 In this regard, the December 2002 Copenhagen European Council introduced 
2004 as the ‘conditional’  starting date of accession negotiations  :  ‘If the 
European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a 
recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the 
Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession 
negotiations without delay.’ Bull. EU, I.6.19.    
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states.’
130 Turkey benefits from increased pre-accession financial 
assistance and the Accession Partnership constitutes the basis of 
contemporary EU-Turkey relations. Moreover, due to the 
establishment of the EC-Turkey Customs Union, Turkey benefits 
from close relationships with the EU which go well beyond those 
of other neighbouring countries. From a political and diplomatic 
point of view, the inclusion of Turkey into the new Neighbourhood 
Policy would therefore be perceived as a new attempt to impose an 
alternative to membership. This, however, does not exclude that 
Turkey can play an important role in the further development of the 
EU’s Neighbourhood Policy.  
 
2.  EFTA countries: a question of time? 
 
For obvious reasons the EU’s new Neighbourhood Policy does not 
include the countries covered by the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA). These countries already border the EU, they 
do not share the common problems of economic development and 
political instability, and, foremost, they already enjoy a far-
reaching level of integration with the EU. Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein take part in the European Economic Area (EEA), 
governed by the EU’s single market acquis. This is the closed form 
of co-operation without assuming the full responsibilities of EU 
Membership and forms, according to the Commission’s ‘Wider 
Europe’ Communication, a long-term perspective for all EU 
neighbours.
131  
 
Switzerland and micro-states such as Andorra, San Marino and 
Monaco are not included in the EEA. However, their geographic 
location and close economic interdependence with the EU Member 
States implies that they are also largely affected by the Union’s 
acquis communautaire. In the framework of the forthcoming 
enlargement and the increasing attention to the new Neighbourhood 
Policy, these countries will experience even greater pressure to 
reconsider their relations with the EU and their position in 
                                                 
130 Presidency Conclusions Copenhagen European Council (12-13 December 
2002), Bull. EU, I.6.18. 
131  See footnote 48, p. 15. 
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Europe.
132 New discussions concerning future EU membership 
cannot be excluded in countries such as Norway and Switzerland. 
Given their high level of legal approximation with the EU it can 
even be argued that the future accession of these countries is only a 
matter of time.
133
 
3.  The western Balkan countries: ‘potential’ EU Member 
States 
 
The March 2003 Commission Communication also explicitly 
excludes the western Balkan countries, included in the Stabilisation 
and Association Process
134, from the scope of the new 
Neighbourhood Policy. The explicit link between these countries’ 
membership perspective and their exclusion from the Wider Europe 
initiative contributes to the perception that the latter programme is 
entailed as an alternative to EU accession. In this regard, Neven 
Mimica, the Croatian Minister for European Integration, stated that 
the EU’s political and moral commitment towards the western 
Balkans implies that this area cannot fall within the scope of the 
Wider Europe concept. She even maintains that the inclusion of 
this region would be ‘the worst possible scenario.’
135 The 
underlying fear of being trapped into alternative models of 
cooperation clearly echoes the initial Ukrainian reactions to the 
Commission proposals (see supra) and reveals the paradoxical 
situation that the new policy is regarded as the emanation of a new 
                                                 
132 It is noteworthy that the European Parliament ‘calls for particular attention to 
be paid to those European countries which, by reason of size or choice, have not 
participated in the Union’s enlargement process’. (see supra) 
133 M. Maresceau, ‘L’Union européenne élargie et les relations de proximité 
intra-européennes : un essai de synthèse’, Paris, CEDECE, forthcoming.  
134 The 24 November 2000 Zagreb Summit launched the Stabilisation and 
Association Process, including Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (the latter being transformed into the republic of Serbia and 
Montenegro).  
For an overview, see : 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/index.htm   
135 N. Mimica, ‘Croatia and the European Union - Steps Ahead ?’, Centre for 
European Policy Studies, Brussels, available at: http://www.ceps.be  
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dividing line in Europe between countries having EU membership 
perspectives and other without such a prospect.  
 
Taking into account the fact that issues relating to effective border 
management and good neighbourly relations cannot be postponed 
until the eventual accession of the western Balkan countries, there 
are good reasons to involve these countries within the new 
Neighbourhood Policy. The political and economic problems 
surrounding countries such as Albania, Macedonia and Serbia-
Montenegro exclude the perspective of short-term EU accession. 
For the time being, the new Neighbourhood Policy could provide 
an interesting framework for cooperation. According to the EP, it 
can be argued that the new policy is a useful instrument towards the 
fulfilment of the accession criteria.
136 Furthermore, the western 
Balkans’ geographical position implies that it would be difficult if 
not impossible to ignore this region anyway. The fact that the July 
2003 Commission Communication on the New Neighbourhood 
Instrument (see supra) also covers the western Balkan countries 
that benefit from CARDS provides a good example in this regard. 
It is also noteworthy that the European Parliament refers to the 
involvement of the western Balkans into the new Neighbourhood 
Policy (see supra).  
 
General Conclusion 
 
The gradual development of a specific Neighbourhood Policy 
reveals a growing awareness of the external consequences of the 
forthcoming EU enlargement. On the eve of an extension towards 
ten new Member States, the Union faces the challenge of realising 
its axiomatic statement that enlargement will also be beneficial for 
those not involved in this process. During the accession 
negotiations, the tendency to separate the EU enlargement and 
external relations policies entailed the risk of creating a new 
dividing line in Europe. Recent proposals to come up with a 
genuine Neighbourhood Policy, which would be constituted on the 
basis of a new title in the forthcoming constitutional Treaty, 
reflects a commitment to tackle this issue.  
                                                 
136 See footnote 56, p. 7. 
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Earlier attempts to develop new policy instruments towards the 
Union’s immediate neighbourhood failed to fulfil their initial 
objectives. For instance, the failure of the CSs to improve the EU’s 
external action in its surrounding areas enhanced the need for a 
comprehensive ‘proximity policy’. According to Secretary-
General/High Representative Javier Solana the existing CSs lack 
flexibility and tend to be too broadly defined in scope to be truly 
effective.
137 The poor effectiveness of the first CSs and their 
limited added value to existing policies can, therefore, explain the 
implicit dropping of a Balkan CS. For this region, a specific 
Stabilisation and Association Process includes a prospect of future 
EU Membership. On the other hand, it is obvious that the Union 
cannot go on enlarging forever. Every widening necessarily 
complicates the further deepening of European integration. In the 
end, continued enlargement risks complicating or even suppressing 
any new steps towards the realisation of ‘an ever closer Union’. 
Consequently, the EU requires, at least in a short-term perspective, 
adequate policies towards its immediate neighbourhood.  This 
challenge basically applies to the neighbouring countries of an 
enlarged EU that do not currently have a perspective of EU 
Membership: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova on the one 
hand and, on the other hand, the non-European southern 
Mediterranean partners (the Maghreb countries: Morocco, Tunisia, 
Algeria; the Mashreq countries: Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria 
and the Palestinian territories; as well as Israel) having no 
accession prospects at all.  
 
Up to now, the Union has tried to cope with its new neighbourhood 
on an ill-defined legal and political basis. The European 
Convention provided a unique opportunity to change this situation. 
Notwithstanding the fact that no special Working Group dealt with 
the issue of new neighbourhood relations, a new title and 
corresponding article (Art. 56) on ‘the Union and its immediate 
environment’ has been included in the draft Treaty. It has to be 
mentioned, however, that this article is basically a political 
declaration of intent. Nevertheless, this reference article can 
                                                 
137 Common Strategies: report by the Secretary-General/High Representative 
14871/00, 21 Dec. 2000. 
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contribute to the development of a genuine Neighbourhood Policy. 
In this regard, the Commission and its President have launched a 
number of interesting proposals. Basically, a distinction can be 
made between the question of the Eastern Neighbours and the 
wider framework of an all-inclusive policy towards the Union’s 
immediate neighbourhood. Whereas an initial paper, presented on 
behalf of Chris Patten and Javier Solana, clearly prioritised the 
future relations with Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, 
Romano Prodi and Pasqualina Napoletano (in the draft report of the 
European Parliament) stressed the importance of adopting a more 
balanced approach towards the southern and eastern dimensions of 
the Neighbourhood Policy. 
 
A combination of attractive opportunities and strong conditions for 
access to these benefits is to be the main guideline of the EU’s new 
proximity policy. Taking into account the huge differences between 
distinctive neighbouring regions and countries, differentiation will 
be indispensable.  
 
The dividing line between differentiation and discrimination is 
however not always very obvious
138. The main challenge for the 
Mediterranean partners is, therefore, to avoid a dilution of the EMP 
within the broader proximity policy. This scenario could indeed 
coincide with the perception of the southern Mediterranean as a 
‘buffer zone’, whose primary task would be to safeguard the area of 
freedom, security and justice inside the EU by means of effective 
and strict border controls. It is obvious that such a policy would 
create new political and human barriers. On the other hand, it 
cannot be denied that a well-designed proximity policy has a 
number of attractive potential advantages. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
138 In this regard, a reference can be made to the recent Commission proposals on 
local border traffic at the external land borders of the Union (see footnote 53). 
84 